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Abstract
The first paper of this thesis uses a unique data set to assess the determinants of
inflows and outflows in the fund industry. The higher frequency of the data allows
to examine whether recent past performance affects the flow-performance relation.
I find that the latter is concave for the worst-performing funds and convex for the
best-performing funds. This is in stark contrast to previous studies in the litera-
ture that document a strict convex relationship. The disaggregation by inflows and
outflows further indicates that the concavity is mainly due to outflows, which react
much quicker to bad performance than previously assumed, whereas the convexity
is driven by inflows. Finally, I also compare how the type of client affects the flow-
performance relationship. I show that investors deemed less sophisticated care more
about short-term performance than other investors, and more about raw returns than
risk-adjusted returns.
The second paper investigates how funds shift risk as a function of past perfor-
mance. In contrast to the literature, I manage to disentangle the implicit incentive
generated by the flow-performance relationship from the direct incentive generated by
the portfolio manager remuneration contract. Identification is only possible because
I focus on funds that pay bonus every six months instead of every year. I show not
only that contracts have an asymmetric effect on risk, but also that the tournament
within the fund family is the main driver of risk shifting. This is consistent with
families actively engaging in the tournament by transferring not only performance, as
suggested by the literature, but also risk from their worst- to their best-performing
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funds.
The last paper is joint with Pedro A. Saffi and uses a data set of Brazilian hedge
funds holdings to examine the impact of long and short positions on performance. In
particular, we test if changes in long/short positions and their risk can forecast future
performance. While we find that funds with large increases in the risk of long-only
positions risk relative to the previous 24 months underperform by about 3% per year
on average, those that increase the risk of short-only positions overperform their peers
by about 1% a year on average, net of fees. Neither monthly changes of long nor short
positions can forecast next month’s abnormal returns.
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Introduction
The original idea of this dissertation came from the discussion of Chevalier and Ellison
(1997). It immediately struck me that, if the person responsible for running the fund,
the trader, is also compensated in the beginning of the year based on the previous
year’s performance, how can they argue that the changes in risk that happen in
the end of the year are a response only to the implicit incentive generated by the
flow-performance relationship? Having previously worked in the banking industry in
Brazil, I remembered that there, traders are compensated every six months instead
of every year and that it could be possible, using Brazilian data, to try to disentangle
these effects. This idea developed into the second chapter of this dissertation. There I
show that not only the implicit (flow-performance relationship) and explicit incentives
(bonus) have an asymmetric impact on risk, but that there exists another tournament
within the fund family that is one of the main drivers of risk shifting. This extra layer
of contracting (between the investor and the family, and between the family and the
trader) gives rise to an agency problem that needs to be further investigated.
Before embarking on the analysis of the relation between past performance and
risk-shifting, I had to take one step back and evaluate how the flow-performance rela-
tionship looked like for Brazilian data. As I use a data set that has seldom been used
before, from an emerging market country whose financial market is not commonly
studied, a few questions needed to be answered beforehand. To the surprise of most
people I encounter, Brazilian fund data are much richer than their American counter-
part. They span a shorter period of time (most data start from the mid-1990’s), but
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it is usually easier to impose transparency in a new, developing market than trying
to change a very mature one. The completeness of the database, allowed me to study
the flow-performance relationship using data at a higher frequency (monthly instead
of annually) and disaggregated in inflows and outflows instead of just looking at net
flows as it is common in the literature. As a result, a study that should have been
a section of a paper was transformed in a full paper, and is now the first chapter
of this dissertation. In contrast to previous papers, I find that the flow-performance
relationship, although convex for the best performing funds, is concave for the worst
performing funds, not flat as most papers assume. This difference arises because
outflows react much quicker to a bad performance than inflows. As a consequence,
papers that rely on annual data, ignoring short-term fund performance, will most
certainly fail to detect the concavity on the left tail of the distribution. Moreover
it implies that investors tend to buy high at sell low, which may turn funds into a
particularly bad investment.
The richness of the database allows one not only to study old issues from a different
perspective, but also to make empirical studies that would have been impossible using
American data. In the last paper, co-authored with Pedro A. Saffi, we use a data set
of Brazilian hedge funds holdings to examine the impact of long and short positions
on performance. In particular, we test if changes in long/short positions and their
risk can forecast future performance. While we find that funds with large increases in
the risk of long-only positions risk relative to the previous 24 months underperform
by about 3% per year on average, those that increase the risk of short-only positions
overperform their peers by about 1% a year on average, net of fees. Neither monthly
changes of long nor short positions can forecast next month’s abnormal returns. This
paper is still a working paper and needs to be further expanded, especially in what
concerns the time span. However, it gives an idea of the amount of information we
have and how it can be further explored.
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Chapter 1
Is the flow-performance relation
really convex? New evidence using
higher frequency data
1.1 Introduction
The behavior of mutual fund flows in the US is very well documented. Several studies
find that the best performing funds receive disproportionately more resources relative
to other funds, whereas investors fail to withdraw from poorly performing funds (see
e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). In other words, managers
appear to receive large rewards in the form of increased flows after large returns, but
very little punishment for underperforming. These results always puzzled practition-
ers that tend to assert that investors buy at the peak and sell at the bottom, i.e.,
flocking to the best performing funds but redeeming their shares as soon as the fund’s
relative performance deteriorates.
In this paper, I use disaggregated inflows and outflows data to show that investors
are actually much quicker in withdrawing funds from bad performing funds than the
literature suggests. More specifically, I find that the flow-performance relationship is
not strictly convex once one accounts for the funds’ most recent performance (up to
the previous month). It is in fact concave for the worst performing funds, becoming
convex only as performance improves. I show that this results from the fact that
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outflows are much more sensitive to very recent performance than inflows. Previous
studies are not able to capture this feature because they use aggregated net flow
data at the yearly frequency, relating net inflows in a specific year with performance
in the previous year. This not only disregards any differences between inflows and
outflows, but it also implicitly assumes that either both inflows and outflows occur
mostly in the beginning of the year or that investors ignore the funds’ most recent
information whenever they are rebalancing their portfolio. As a result, given that
outflows respond quicker to recent performance than inflows, analyzing yearly data
completely misses out the concave component of flow-performance relation.
This analysis is only possible because I examine a unique data set from the Brazil-
ian fund industry that provides funds’ returns, assets under management as well as
both inflows and outflows at a daily frequency. The fund industry in Brazil is rela-
tively big, with about $1.1 trillion dollars under management,1 and very transparent.
The regulatory framework is the same for every investment fund in the country (non
off-shore). This means that both mutual and hedge funds have to disclose exactly
the same amount of information at the same frequency. This allows studying their
behavior at a much higher frequency and assessing the determinant of inflows and
outflows independently. In addition, the database is free of self-reporting bias and
allows one to measure the flow-performance relationship controlling for any specific
fund characteristic that might affect investment decisions, such as share restrictions
and investor type.
Differentiating between fund type and controlling for fund characteristics and
restrictions is key to determine the flow-performance relationship. Agarwal, Daniel
and Naik (2004) find a convex flow-performance relationship for hedge funds, but their
result is not consensual. For instance, Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) report a
1 The Brazilian fund industry ranked sixth in the world in the second quarter of 2011 according
to the ICI. Ireland with USD$1.1 trillion appeared in the fifth and the UK, with USD$0.9 trillion,
in seventh position.
15
concave relation, whereas Baquero and Verbeek (2005) document a linear one. Ding,
Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2009) try to reconcile these results by arguing that
these differences are due to specific restrictions that hedge funds managers impose on
investors, e.g., statutory restrictions on the number of investors, minimum investment
amounts, lockup and redemption periods, etc. They show that hedge funds with little
or no flow restrictions are more similar to mutual funds, and hence exhibit a convex
flow-performance relationship, whereas funds with flow restrictions display a concave
relationship.
Hedge funds and mutual funds dwell however within very distinct institutional
frameworks and cater to different types of investors. As a result, isolating the effect
of a specific fund characteristic can produce results not applicable to other types of
funds and/or countries. In addition, there are some serious limitations on the data
available for empirical studies on both hedge funds and mutual funds that might
affect the reliability of the results. Most hedge-fund data sets are based on self-
reporting and hence very likely to carry serious sample selection bias. Furthermore,
there is no actual data on flows. All the results are for net inflows calculated from net
assets value and returns. Although it is possible to draw inferences for the response
of net inflows to past performance, there is ample evidence that market participants
behave differently according to whether they are investing or withdrawing money (see,
among others, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). This means that inflows and outflows are
possibly driven by distinct factors, which are impossible to identify using the usual
data sets in the empirical literature.
The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 1.2 provides a
primer on the Brazilian regulatory environment as well as describes the main features
of the data set and of the sample. Section 1.2.5 then delineates the model, whereas
Section 1.3 discusses the empirical findings and a number of robustness checks. Fi-
nally, Section 1.4 offers some concluding remarks.
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1.2 Data description
1.2.1 Regulatory environment
Brazilian funds are regulated by both the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios, from now on CVM) and by a self-regulatory
body, Anbima.2 Although rules have been evolving over time, both agencies have a
very strong bend towards transparency. Brazilian funds have to send daily reports
with return, net assets, share value, and number of shareholders to CVM. Since Jan-
uary 2005, CVM has also started disclosing daily information on disaggregated inflows
and outflows. In addition, CVM requests a monthly report with end-of-the-month
information on their portfolio holdings since 2006. The daily information is made
available to the public from the CVM website within, at most, two days. The delay
in the portfolio holdings disclosure dropped in July 2009 from three months to just
fifteen days, though funds may request CVM to delay the disclosure to the public for
up to three months. Such requests are usually granted. In addition to the disclosing
rules, funds are required to mark to market since 2002.
Investment funds in Brazil must have a fund administrator and a custodian, each
must be completely independent of the portfolio manager. The fund administrator is
the legal representative of the shareholders with the fund. Along with the custodian,
they are responsible for keeping the books, calculating and posting the fund’s share
price daily. It is the administrator that actually does the reporting to the CVM and
to the shareholders. Given the mark-to-market requirements, administrators are key
players in that they are responsible for checking the prices of all securities a fund holds.
As a rule, the same security held by different funds needs to have the same price on
their books as long as they have the same administrator. Given that administrators
2 See Varga and Wengert (2009) for a detailed description of the regulatory environment.
17
are audited every six months and that three companies work as custodians of about
three quarters of the investment funds in Brazil, prices of illiquid assets are never too
far apart.
In contrast to US regulations that distinguishes between mutual funds and hedge
funds, every investment fund in Brazil falls under the same regulatory framework.
Until March 2008, the classification of the funds was based mainly on the classes of
assets they could invest in (e.g., multi-market without restrictions, equity, and fixed-
income) and to what extent they could use derivatives and short selling. As from
March 2008, the classification changed, becoming more dependent on the trading
strategy chosen by the fund. Instead of using the usual classification of mutual funds
and hedge funds, I will differentiate funds by their restrictions and the type of client
they cater.
When starting a new fund, the manager must decide to which type of investor
the fund will cater. There are six broad categories, though I restrict attention to
funds on three specific categories - all investors, qualified investors and institutional
investors - as the other four impose a strict restriction on the type of shareholders.3
Qualified investors consist of financial institutions, pension funds, chartered financial
analysts and any other investor with at least BRL$300,000 available for investment.
Some types of funds (as hedge funds in the US) can cater only to qualified investors.
The client restriction is usually linked to the type of financial instruments the fund
is allowed to invest in: the riskier the fund, the more restrictions on the investor.
Recently, the CVM has required some types of funds to only accept qualified investors
that invest a minimum of BRL$1 million (super-qualified investors).
3 The four excluded categories are: ‘Exclusive’ (one single shareholder), ‘pension funds’, ‘re-
strict’ (shareholders need to be linked somehow, e.g. family, business partners, organizations) and
‘dedicated’ (only employees within the same company).
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1.2.2 Sample selection
As of June 2011, assets under management in the Brazilian fund industry tallied
around USD$1.1 trillion according to the ICI. The daily data I employ come from the
Quantum Axis database, which tracks virtually all funds based in Brazil. In addition
to the CVM data, Quantum also provides all sorts of qualitative information about
the fund: e.g., inception date, style, flow restrictions, fees, investment objectives, and
the type of investors the fund caters to. The daily data can be very noisy and I
aggregate the flow data to a monthly frequency. I nonetheless use the daily data to
compute monthly risk measures for every fund.
I focus exclusively on multi-market and equity funds, dropping short-term, fixed-
income, and pension funds. Among the funds within the multi-market and equity
styles, I also eliminate balanced, money market, international, index funds, funds
exclusive to one or very few specific clients (i.e., less than four), and funds of funds. I
disregard the first year of life of every fund as this is usually associated with incubation
stage, and very small funds. I define small as a fund that manages less than R$5
million (USD$2.87 million) for more than 75% of the sample period. The daily sample
ranges from January 1997 to June 2009, apart from information on inflows/outflows
and on the number of shareholders, which start only in January 2005. According to
Anbima, as of December 2011, multi-market and equity funds comprised, respectively,
24.6% and 12.3% of total assets under management in Brazil and the sample selected
represents around 60% of their total volume.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics. The final sample includes 906 distinct funds
with 42,579 valid fund-month observations (or 4,348 valid fund-year observations) of
net-of-fees returns and total net assets. Out of these 906 funds, 327 funds did not
survive past June 2009, with 128 incorporations and 199 liquidations. Although the
Quantum database keeps record of defunct funds, the fact that no funds are liqui-
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dated between 1997 and 2000 indicates that there might be a backfill bias for the first
years of the data set. Table 1.1 shows that the number of equity and multi-market
funds increases steadily from 1997 to 2000, then stabilizes until 2003. The industry
resumes growing in 2004, slowly at first, but then at a faster rate even during the
recent global financial crisis. This is despite an increase in the number of funds that
are either liquidated or incorporated by other funds. The average assets under man-
agement is stable from 1997 to 2002, at around USD$30 million but increases almost
exponentially between 2003 and 2007.
1.2.3 Fees, flows and client restrictions
Table 1.2(a) shows that 20% of the funds in the sample impose some kind of flow
restriction: e.g., lockup and advance notice periods (with or without early withdrawal
fee). The lockup period is the initial amount of time investors have to keep their
money in the fund before being able to redeem shares. Investors can only access
their money once the lockup period is over. The advance notice period is the time
of advance notice investors must give to the fund before cashing in shares of the
fund. There are funds that significantly reduce their notice period in exchange for an
early withdrawal fee. Finally, over 5% of the funds restrict inflows by closing to new
investors.
Some funds also have restrictions on the type of investor they are allowed to cater
to. This restrictions is defined at fund inception and is determined by the CVM
based on the type of assets and financial instruments the fund chooses to trade. The
majority of funds don’t impose any restriction on the investor, but 42% can only cater
to qualified investors (which includes institutional investors). Given this breakdown,
it is possible to analyze whether different investors have distinct reactions to past
performance.
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Table 1.2(b) shows the distribution of restrictions and fees across funds. There are
only 16 funds in the database that impose a lockup period. Although it varies from 2
days to 2 years, most funds require less than 3 months of lockup period. The number
of funds with significant lockup period (over 3 months) is, however, too small to make
any inference and I have excluded them from the sample. In contrast, just over half of
the funds impose an advance notice period. The latter is on average about one month
without any redemption fee, even if it ranges from 5 days to 3 months. The average
number of days the investor has to wait to redeem her shares is 5 days (possibly in
exchange for a redemption fee), though the majority of funds require only one day
of advance notice. There are 114 funds that charge early withdrawal fees from 1%
to 15% (typically around 5%). There are only 12 funds in which the advance notice
period and withdrawal fee depend on the size of the withdrawal. As expected, the
bigger the withdrawal, the longer the wait. Because of the very particular nature
of this restriction and because the number of funds that impose it is too small, I
have also excluded this group of funds from the sample. Section 1.3.3 discusses how
restrictions might affect the slope of the flow-performance relationship.
Brazilian funds have, in general, the same fee structure as US funds: the typical
management and performance fees are, if any, of 2% and 20%, respectively. There
is not much variation in the former, whereas the latter vary more frequently from
10% to 100%. The performance fee is charged on whatever exceeds the hurdle rate
and is typically 105% of the CDI, which can be defined as a Brazilian libor rate.
Both fees are charged daily as fund expenses but the performance fee is only paid ev-
ery six months (end of June and end of December) relative to the previous six months.
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1.2.4 Flow data description
Table 1.3 reports some summary statistics for monthly flow data. The statistics for
net(-of-returns) flows refer to the period from January 1997 to July 2009, whereas
inflows and outflows figures are for January 2005 to July 2009. Ideally, I would
have all data spanning the same time period, however the industry is relatively new
and disregarding the first years of information is not a plausible option. Changes in
regulation over the years mean that the availability of information has been increasing.
I define flows relative to the previous month’s total net assets. For each month,
I first calculate the total net flow, the inflow and the outflow, and then divide each
by the previous month’s total assets under management. Finally, I take the average
of the monthly flows for each fund through time before reporting the cross-sectional
characteristics of the data. The sample excludes incorporated and incorporating funds
on the day of the event. However, it does not drop funds that are liquidated for any
other reason. Instead, their net flows are set to -100% and their final outflow to 100%.
It is interesting to observe that despite the robust growth in the fund industry over
the sample period, the typical net flow is close to zero, with a slightly positive mean
and a marginally negative median. In addition, the average net flow becomes slightly
negative if one weighs the net flows by assets under management. This happens
because larger funds receive more net inflows than smaller funds not only in absolute
values, but also relative to their assets under management.4
The breakdown between inflows and outflows is one of the unique features of this
database. It is interesting to observe that their distributions are pretty similar, thereof
indicating a significant monthly turnover within the industry. The mean, median
and standard deviation of the inflows are about 10% higher than the corresponding
values for the outflows. Weighing by assets under management reduces considerably
4Capital gain tax do not affect flows because Brazilian funds must account for them by decreasing
the number of shares rather than the share value.
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the difference in mean, though slightly increasing the discrepancy in the standard
deviations. Notice that the sample period for net inflows and gross flows is not the
same.
Table 1.4(a) describes the after-fee returns of an equally-weighted fund indices
from January 1997 to July 2009. Although funds experience average monthly returns
of over 1%, they seem to entail poor excess returns. For instance, the average monthly
return on multi-market funds is of almost 1.2%, though the average excess return over
the interbank loan rate (CDI), used as a benchmark across the market, is of -0.09%,
translating into an annualized excess return of -1.2%. The same pattern arises for the
equity funds. They entail an average monthly return of 1.28%, but with an average
excess return of -0.95% per year. Further analysis reveals that both distributions
are quite asymmetric, with skewness and kurtosis coefficients around -0.7 and 5.5,
respectively.
A somewhat different story arises if one considers asset-weighted indices in Table
1.4(b). The overall index keeps yielding an average monthly return of about 1%, but
with a significantly more negative excess return. The multi-market index returns on
average the same 1.20% as before, but now with a marginally positive average excess
return over the CDI. Finally, weighing by asset under management has a profound
impact in the performance of the equity segment. The asset-weighted index of equity
funds displays a relatively lower monthly return of 0.33% and a very negative excess
return of -0.83% per month. Moreover, the standard deviation shoots up to almost
twofold the corresponding equal-weighted value.
1.2.5 Measuring the flow-performance relation
To estimate the flow-performance relationship, I use a piecewise linear relationship
between current fund flows and past returns. The objective is to capture the non-
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linearity of the flow-performance relationship using a simple parametric model. I
divide the funds in quintiles of performance and calculate a different slope for each
quintile. In particular, I split funds into groups according to their performance rank-
ing as in Sirri and Tufano (1998). Their methodology guarantees different slopes for
each quintile but also that the final flow-performance relationship is continuous. The
first step is to calculate the fractional rank FRf,t ∈ [0, 1] at time t for all funds within
a category (i.e., either equity or multi-market) based on their returns over a spe-
cific time period. Next, I transform the fractional ranking within each performance
quintile as follows:
QR
(1)
f,t = min {0.2,FRf,t}
QR
(q)
f,t = min
{
0.2,FRf,t −
q−1∑
j=1
QR
(j)
f,t
}
, for q = 2, . . . , 5.
As for the performance horizon, I calculate rankings for the previous month, previous
six months and previous twelve months using the cumulated total returns over the
period. For the main analysis, I sort funds on the basis of risk-unadjusted returns
because this is the main information investors have access to. For robustness check,
I also generate a ranking based on the cumulated return over the past twenty-four
months. Some funds report their Sharpe ratio, hence I also calculate a ranking based
on it.
As monthly flows are very volatile, I winsorize inflows, both gross and net, at the
99.5 percentile.5 Funds that are liquidated have their outflow set at 100%, and their
net inflows set at -100%. Funds that are incorporated and those that incorporate
other funds are dropped from the sample for that particular date. Since information
on inflow and outflow is only available since January 2005, I back out earlier monthly
5Monthly inflows and outflows are calculated from daily information. In rare occasions, funds
with a very big turnover can have outflows of over 100%. I set the maximum monthly outflow to be
equal to 100%.
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net flows from assets under management (AUM) and returns data as follows:
NFf,t = AUMf,t − AUMf,t−1(1 +Rf,t), (1.1)
where Rf,t is the return on the fund f on month t. I then investigate the determinants
of fund flows by regressing the ratio of fund flow to total net assets on the different
performance quintiles plus controls. More specifically, the ratio is given by either net
flow (NF), inflow (IF) or outflow (OF) divided by the fund’s total net assets in the
previous month. On top of time and fund fixed effects, the set of additional regressors
includes the volatility of the fund in the previous 1, 6 and 12 months. As suggested
by Merton (1980) and French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), I measure volatility
by the square root of the annualized realized variance based on daily squared returns
over the specified period. I also control for the size of the fund and the growth of the
category to which the fund belongs (either multi-market or equity), both at the end
of the previous month. I gauge them respectively by the logarithm of the total net
assets under management and by the relative net flows to the broad category/style.
The latter first aggregates the monthly net flows of every fund within a particular
style and then divide it by the total net assets under management within that style
in the previous month.
Given that the fund custodian (and not the portfolio manager) is responsible for
pricing the securities and for keeping record of the fund’s trades, there is little room for
performance smoothing (Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004). In addition, due to the
marking-to-market practice and to the reliance on the fund custodian/administrator
to price the assets, exposure to illiquid assets should play a minor role as well.
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1.3 Flows and past performance
1.3.1 Net inflows
I estimate a panel data regression with fund and time fixed effects. As I use monthly
data, it is possible to analyze the impact of the recent history on flows. In order to
better assess the impact of past performance, I generate the ranking of funds’ returns
in the previous month, in the previous six months and in the previous twelve months.
I refer to them as short-, medium- and long-run past performances, respectively. The
shape of the flow-performance relationship varies with the time horizon and, what
is in general neglected by the literature, flows are quite responsive to short-run past
performance.
Table 1.5(a) shows the coefficient estimates as well as their standard errors clus-
tered by fund. A double cluster procedure (by fund and time) as suggested by Petersen
(2009) has also been used but doesn’t affect the results. The dependent variable is
the percentage monthly net inflows with respect to total net assets in the end of the
previous month. The regressors of interest are the ranking position of the fund split
into quintiles for three different time horizons (one, six and twelve months). Models
(2) to (4) display the impact of the three measures of past performance individually.
The short-run and long-run measures have a similar pattern. The flow-performance
relationship is concave for the poor performing funds, but then becomes convex once
funds start performing better. The medium-run measure of performance is clearly
convex.
Including all measures of past performance in the same regression improves the
goodness of fit significantly, though their individual impact becomes smaller. There
is no qualitative change in the shape of the flow-performance relationship and in the
precision of the estimates of the coefficients, though. In general, investors seem to
classify funds in three groups: big losers, average funds and top performers. Net
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inflows increase with performance but at different growth rates. Moreover the re-
sponses to short-, medium- and long-run performances also vary considerably. Funds
performing poorly in the short run and/or in the long run receive proportionally much
less net inflows than all other funds. Investors however do not seem to punish funds
that perform badly only in the medium-run. As for the best funds, investors give
more weight to medium- and long-run performances, whereas short-run performance
has little impact on net inflows. Figure 1.1 plots the flow-performance relationship
for the 3 measures of past performance.
Although the concavity of the bottom part of the distribution seems to conflict
with previous findings in the literature, the differences are likely due to the sampling
frequency. Apart from a few exceptions (e.g., Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny and
Ozelge, 2010), the literature uses end-of-year information only, relating net inflows
in a particular year with performance in the previous year. The aggregation of net
inflows within a year prevents the analysis of the impact of recent past performance
on flows. In contrast, there is no loss of information due to aggregation here, because
of the monthly frequency of the data. The results are in fact consistent with the
conclusion of Elton et al. (2010) that the use of more frequent data may change, or
even reverse, previous findings about investment manager behavior.
As net inflows are just the difference between inflows and outflows, negative net
inflows indicate the fund has more outflows than inflows. As the focus here is to
relate past performance to flows, it is natural to expect that better performing funds
will have more inflows than outflows, i.e. positive net inflows, and that the worst
performing funds will have negative net inflows. For instance, the bottom quintile
aggregates the worst performing funds, and hence its coefficient is most likely driven
by outflows. In the next section, I look into gross inflows and outflows to better
understand their individual reactions to past performance.
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1.3.2 Gross inflows and outflows
In general, the information necessary for calculating net inflows are readily available
as opposed to disaggregated data on gross flows. As a result, most studies in the
literature focus on the determinants of net inflows. Bergstresser and Poterba (2002)
is the one exception up to my knowledge that examines gross inflows and outflows,
although in a different context. Inflows- and outflows-performance relationship may
have diverse patterns if the decision of investing and redeeming shares respond to
different time horizons of past performance. Tables 1.5(b) and 1.5(c) report that
inflows are mostly driven by medium- and long-term performance, whereas outflows
react mainly to short- and medium-term performance.
For gross inflows, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger the longer the time
horizon, especially for the top and bottom quintiles. Short-term performance has
almost no impact, if any, on inflows. Better performing funds in the long run are the
clear winners and long-run worst-performing funds, the losers. There is still a clear
convex inflow-performance relationship for medium-run performance.
The results for outflows are in line with the findings for net inflows, with a stronger
impact of short and medium-term performance relative to long-term performance.
Outflow data are however a bit misleading because it may take several days from the
date the investor notifies the fund of the withdrawal until they can actually redeem
the shares. As Table 1.2(b) shows, around half of the funds in the sample has some
sort of redemption restriction and it may take up to ninety days for an investor to
actually cash in her shares. With daily outflows, it is possible to correct outflows by
the length of the redemption restriction. If high-frequency data were not available,
the solution would be to aggregate within a longer period of time.
Tables 1.5(d) and 1.5(e) show the impact of past performance on two measures of
gross outflows. The first measure is adjusted for the minimum redemption period an
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investor needs to wait (usually implies the payment of a fee). The second is adjusted
for the maximum redemption period (in general free of charge). Short-run perfor-
mance is relatively more important for investors that are willing to pay to redeem
their shares as soon as possible, whereas investors that are inclined to wait care more
about long-term performance. A particularly bad short-term performance thus in-
duces investors to withdraw funds as soon as possible, corroborating the conjecture
that aggregation wastes valuable information.
1.3.3 Robustness Checks
Performance terciles
Table 1.6 shows the result for performance terciles instead of quintiles. The above
patterns are even more pronounced now. For net inflows, there is a clear convexity in
the medium run, and, to some extend, also on the long-run. However, as before, in-
vestors seem to act very quickly to punish a really bad performance. Inflows respond
mainly to medium and long-term performances. The long-run inflow-performance
relationship is clearly convex, whereas the response of outflows to long-run past per-
formance is flat for the bottom quintile and then decreases linearly with performance.
This difference generates a slight convexity in the net response.
Risk-adjusted returns
All the previous results were based on returns not adjusted for risk. This specifica-
tion is key if one wants to further investigate the implicit incentive that the flow-
performance relationship entails for fund managers. However if investors care about
risk-adjusted returns, the previous results would only be concealing the true relation
between flows and returns. Although several measures of risk-adjusted returns could
be calculated, I will concentrate on Sharpe ratio for the simple reason that this mea-
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sure is, in general, available to investors. Several funds print on their monthly reports
not only their volatility but also their Sharpe ratio which can be used by investors
to compare funds. Table 1.7(a) shows that although the main results are still valid,
the relation between flows and performance is less clear than previously stated. Net
inflows are still convex in the medium-run and there’s still evidence that outflows
react to short-term performance as opposed to inflows. Investors however seem to
only differentiate the bad funds and the very good funds.
Table 1.7(b) used terciles of past performance and the results are more neat. Net
inflows reaction to long-run performance is slightly convex, almost linear, and the
medium-run flow-performance relationship is convex. Investors tend to chase funds
with the best performance in the medium and long run and leave funds that have a
poor performance in the short and medium run.
1.3.4 Type of investor
One of the main problems when comparing mutual and hedge funds is that the type
of clients these funds cater to is very different. In general, only qualified investors
can invest in hedge funds because they are deemed to be more sophisticated, with
a better understanding of financial markets. This restriction also protects smaller
investors from taking excessive risk and investing in products they might not fully
understand. In this section, I divide funds in three sub-samples depending on the
type of clients the funds caters: no restriction, qualified investors and institutional
investors. If qualified investors are indeed more skilled, they should choose funds not
based on total returns, but on risk-adjusted returns. Qualified investors should be
even less responsive to raw returns as evidence shows that they react mainly to the
fund’s tracking error (see, among others, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002).
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show how different investors react to past performance by split-
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ting funds in terciles. I employ terciles because the number of funds drop considerably
as the sample gets more restricted. The results show that the type of client has in-
deed a very strong impact on the flow-performance relationship which might explain
some of the differences between the flow-performance relationship on hedge funds and
mutual funds in the US.
Table 1.8 relates net inflow to raw past performance and shows that the convexity
on the top part of the distribution is even more accentuated in the group of funds that
impose no restrictions on the type of client compared to the average. Non-qualified
investors are more eager to favoring overall winners than other investors. They are also
more unforgiving with a short-term bad performance. Comparing the second column
in tables 1.8 and 1.9, although non-qualified investors chase good performance, they
also care about Sharpe ratio, but not enough to punish a fund with low Sharpe ratio.
In the battle between raw returns and risk-adjusted returns, general investors care
more about the former even though they still pay some attention to risk.
Another important result is that qualified and institutional investor care relatively
more about long-run performance than other investors. This is not surprising as these
investors are usually bigger clients that cannot move funds around so quickly. More-
over they possibly have a different investment horizon. What is more curious is that
institutional investors seem to display a strictly convex flow-performance relationship
in response to long-term raw returns and to medium-term risk-adjusted returns which
can be linked to the rebalancing frequency. The results also seem to indicate that
institutional investors are driving all the results of qualified investors, as the data for
qualified investors include institutional investors. Unfortunately there is not enough
data points to generate a subsample based on non-institutional qualified investors
only.
Further analysis using the subsample for which I have inflows and outflows show
similar pattern, however due to the small number of observations they are not con-
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clusive and are not reported.
1.4 Conclusion and Further Research
For years both academics and practitioners have been puzzled by the previous findings
that investors react very slowly to bad performances. Investors seemed not to be
fleeing from the worst performing funds, even though chasing the best performing
funds. Although many would have claimed that investors tend to have bad timing
by buying high and selling low, the empirical evidence suggested that the second
part was not happening. This paper sheds some light in this discussion by claiming
that investors do indeed withdraw funds after a short spell of bad performance. I
claim that previous papers failed to find this relationship because they use data
sampled at a yearly frequency, relating aggregated net inflows in a specific year with
performance in the previous year. Although this is usually a restriction imposed by
the availability of data, it ends up ignoring the impact of short-term performance on
flows. By examining the data at the monthly frequency, I am able to account for the
impact of short-performance and recent information on flows. I find that the flow-
performance relationship starts concave, but, as performance improves, it becomes
convex, rather than the strictly convex relationship previously described. This pattern
is only apparent because of the sampling frequency. In particular, outflows respond
more quickly to recent performance and hence analyzing yearly data misses out the
concave component of flow-performance relation.
This paper also goes one step further and investigates how the type of investor
the fund caters affect the flow-performance relationship. Studies based on US mutual
funds tend to ignore the type of client the fund caters. However there is evidence
that different clients indeed have different reactions to past performance (e.g pension
funds, or mutual funds versus hedge funds). In this paper I show that investors
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deemed less sophisticated react more to raw returns than to risk-adjusted returns
and that they have a shorter term horizon than more sophisticated clients.
Several questions are still worth investigating. First, if non-sophisticated investors
have bad timing (buying high and selling low) they would receive a return on their
investments that is lower than the fund return. Using daily information on inflows
and outflows, if the series is long enough, it is possible to calculate the client money
return by making a few assumptions and compare it with the actual fund return.
Second, the type of investor seems to be a main determinant of the flow-performance
relationship and it is important to investigate this relation by further the types of
clients. Last, it is important to analyze funds’ restrictions and their impact on the
investors’ decisions.
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Table 1.1: Assets Under Management (in Thousands of US Dollars)
The table shows the end of the year assets under management in thou-
sands of US Dollars for all multi-market and equity funds included in
the sample in the end of each year. This excludes (from the set of multi-
market and equity funds) fund-of-funds; funds that have one single exclu-
sive client (”exclusive” funds); pension funds; funds whose shareholders
need to have some kind of link as being business partners, or belonging
to the same family or organization (”restrict”); and funds that are ex-
clusive to employees within the same company (”dedicated”). The total
number of funds across the sample is 906. All values are in US Dollars
calculated at the exchange rate USD$1 = BRL$1.7412 (as of December
2009)
Number Standard Defunct
of Funds Mean Median Deviation Funds
1997 102 28,337 10,851 48,181 0
1998 162 22,100 5,677 42,481 0
1999 215 21,079 7,143 39,314 0
2000 253 31,448 12,056 55,100 0
2001 287 29,046 10,483 61,360 19
2002 278 27,384 8,789 70,911 44
2003 266 35,655 10,911 88,866 52
2004 293 52,884 16,261 119,764 33
2005 328 54,844 16,197 141,232 29
2006 367 70,703 20,912 176,155 36
2007 434 114,989 45,038 259,057 22
2008 532 92,789 33,869 226,968 53
2009 589 68,023 23,339 186,631 39
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Table 1.2: Funds Characteristics
(a) Investor and Share Restrictions
The table shows the proportion of all funds in the sample that have either a share restriction,
an investor restriction or both. The last column also shows the proportion of funds that charge
performance fee. Funds that charge performance fee and only accept qualified investors are the
hedge fund equivalent (7.17% of the sample).
With Flows With Performance
All Funds Restrictions Fee
All Funds 100% 19.7% 59.3%
No Investor Restriction 58.0% 12.3% 42.3%
Qualified Investors 42.0% 7.4% 17.0%
Institutional Investors 25.0% 1.2% 6.2%
(b) Share Restrictions and Fee Structure
Advance notice period 1 is the minimum number of days an investor need to wait after requesting his money
to be withdrawn. Sometimes, receiving funds in this shorter period of time can only happen in exchange for
a redemption fee. Advance notice period 2 is the maximum number of days an investor needs to wait after
requesting her money to be withdrawn, usually free of charge.
Number Standard
of Funds Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum
Lockup Period (in months) 16 7.99 2.50 8.99 0.07 24.00
Advanced Notice Period 1
(in days, may be charged) 470 5.54 1.00 14.39 1.00 90.00
Advanced Notice Period 2
(in days, not charged) 111 32.29 30.00 19.66 5.00 90.00
Early withdrawal fee (%) 114 6.06 5.00 2.47 1.00 15.00
Performance Fee (%) 534 20.21 20.00 5.51 0.10 100.00
Administration Fee (%) 819 1.77 2.00 1.07 0.00 8.00
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Funds Monthly Flows
The sample excludes the first year of the fund and runs from January 1998 to June 2008 for net
inflows; and from January 2005 for inflows and outflows. The first five columns show statistics for
equally-weighted flows whereas the last two column display information for asset-weighted flows.
Equally Weighted (%) Asset Weighted (%)
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% Mean Std. Dev.
Net Inflows 0.30 -0.06 4.25 -2.13 1.97 -0.25 3.50
Inflows 6.12 5.46 2.23 4.54 7.67 5.95 2.31
Outflows 5.59 5.17 2.04 4.19 6.73 5.73 2.02
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics of Funds Monthly Returns
(a) Equally-weighted returns
Summary statistics of funds’ monthly returns between January 1997 and December 2008.
Gross Returns (%) Excess Returns (%)
Number Standard Standard
of Funds Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation
All Funds 819 1.23 1.43 4.22 -0.07 0.20 4.09
Multi-market 510 1.19 1.38 4.09 -0.09 0.20 3.98
Equity 309 1.28 1.43 4.38 -0.05 0.21 4.24
(b) Asset-weighted returns
Summary statistics of funds’ asset-weighted monthly returns between January 1997 and
December 2008.
Gross Returns (%) Excess Returns (%)
Number Standard Standard
of Funds Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
All Funds 726 0.94 5.34 -0.23 5.26
Multi-market 447 1.21 2.82 0.02 2.77
Equity 279 0.33 8.71 -0.83 8.59
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Table 1.5: Flow-Performance Relationship Regressions
(a) Net inflows to all funds
Panels a to c report the OLS estimates of a monthly fixed effect panel data with net inflows, inflows
and outflows as a dependent variable, respectively, for all funds in the database. Panels d and e have
outflows adjusted for the redemption period as dependent variables. Flows are calculated as a percentage
of the fund’s previous month’s net assets. The independent variables are five quintiles of performance in
the previous month, in the previous six months and in the previous twelve months; the realized volatility
of daily returns in the previous month, previous six months and previous twelve months; the ratio of
the fund volatility and stock market volatility in the previous month, previous six months and previous
twelve months; the natural logarithm of the fund assets in the previous month; style effect, measured as
the percentage net inflow to a particular category at time t relative to the previous month. Regressions
include both year and month time dummies.
Net Inflows (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se
Previous month
1st Quintile 0.092*** (0.035) 0.122*** (0.034)
2nd Quintile 0.060*** (0.022) 0.092*** (0.021)
3rd Quintile 0.018 (0.021) 0.042** (0.020)
4th Quintile 0.048** (0.021) 0.084*** (0.020)
5th Quintile 0.041 (0.032) 0.112*** (0.032)
Previous 6 months
1st Quintile -0.037 (0.036) 0.039 (0.036)
2nd Quintile 0.049* (0.025) 0.109*** (0.024)
3rd Quintile 0.055** (0.022) 0.107*** (0.021)
4th Quintile 0.077*** (0.024) 0.129*** (0.023)
5th Quintile 0.110*** (0.038) 0.238*** (0.038)
Previous 12 months
1st Quintile 0.107** (0.043) 0.142*** (0.045)
2nd Quintile 0.060** (0.025) 0.098*** (0.025)
3rd Quintile 0.073*** (0.022) 0.119*** (0.023)
4th Quintile 0.067*** (0.024) 0.119*** (0.024)
5th Quintile 0.122*** (0.040) 0.228*** (0.041)
Fund Volatilityt−1 -0.034 (0.032) -0.098*** (0.034)
Fund Volatility6mt−1 -0.036 (0.023) -0.024 (0.016)
Fund Volatility12mt−1 0.052* (0.030) 0.012 (0.020)
Closed to investment -0.119*** (0.036) -0.133*** (0.048) -0.132*** (0.040) -0.122*** (0.037)
Ln(Assets)t−1 -0.024*** (0.002) -0.020*** (0.002) -0.022*** (0.002) -0.026*** (0.002)
Style Effectt−1 1.063*** (0.048) 0.610*** (0.043) 0.988*** (0.045) 1.049*** (0.049)
Constant 0.327*** (0.035) 0.345*** (0.030) 0.352*** (0.030) 0.380*** (0.035)
Observations 37,110 43,337 41,160 37,110
Number of Funds 886 942 938 886
Adjusted R2 10.58% 6.96% 9.24% 9.31%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
37
(b) Gross Inflows to all funds
Inflows (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se
Previous month
1st Quintile -0.030 (0.035) -0.029 (0.038)
2nd Quintile 0.054** (0.021) 0.082*** (0.023)
3rd Quintile 0.007 (0.021) 0.031 (0.022)
4th Quintile 0.023 (0.025) 0.038 (0.025)
5th Quintile 0.019 (0.036) 0.078** (0.036)
Previous 6 months
1st Quintile -0.071* (0.039) 0.003 (0.040)
2nd Quintile 0.024 (0.022) 0.062*** (0.023)
3rd Quintile 0.040* (0.023) 0.083*** (0.023)
4th Quintile 0.048* (0.027) 0.077*** (0.026)
5th Quintile 0.127** (0.049) 0.230*** (0.051)
Previous 12 months
1st Quintile 0.133*** (0.049) 0.131*** (0.050)
2nd Quintile -0.006 (0.026) 0.017 (0.027)
3rd Quintile 0.084*** (0.025) 0.115*** (0.025)
4th Quintile 0.022 (0.028) 0.057** (0.028)
5th Quintile 0.185*** (0.052) 0.275*** (0.055)
Fund Volatilityt−1 -0.072* (0.038) -0.041 (0.064)
Fund Volatility6mt−1 -0.014 (0.026) 0.005 (0.030)
Fund Volatility12mt−1 0.067 (0.056) 0.036 (0.045)
Ln(Assets)t−1 -0.029*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.003) -0.031*** (0.003)
Style Effectt 0.505*** (0.060) 0.480*** (0.061) 0.490*** (0.058) 0.470*** (0.058)
Constant 0.531*** (0.061) 0.535*** (0.060) 0.521*** (0.059) 0.566*** (0.060)
Observations 20,345 21,478 21,401 20,345
Number of Funds 706 746 746 706
Adjusted R-squared 8.98% 6.23% 8.06% 8.31%
Excludes funds closed to new investors
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(c) Gross Outflows from all funds
Outflows (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se
Previous month
1st Quintile -0.048 (0.032) -0.078** (0.033)
2nd Quintile -0.041** (0.018) -0.048*** (0.018)
3rd Quintile 0.031* (0.017) 0.023 (0.016)
4th Quintile -0.048*** (0.017) -0.063*** (0.017)
5th Quintile 0.014 (0.024) 0.022 (0.024)
Previous 6 months
1st Quintile -0.039 (0.033) -0.071** (0.036)
2nd Quintile -0.056** (0.022) -0.080*** (0.023)
3rd Quintile 0.012 (0.019) -0.008 (0.019)
4th Quintile -0.050*** (0.017) -0.073*** (0.018)
5th Quintile 0.115*** (0.033) 0.084** (0.035)
Previous 12 months
1st Quintile -0.006 (0.053) -0.055 (0.054)
2nd Quintile -0.043* (0.026) -0.066** (0.027)
3rd Quintile -0.019 (0.022) -0.031 (0.023)
4th Quintile -0.050*** (0.018) -0.068*** (0.018)
5th Quintile 0.007 (0.034) 0.031 (0.037)
Fund Volatilitym−1 -0.089*** (0.029) -0.063 (0.052)
Fund Volatility6mm−1 0.024 (0.024) -0.012 (0.024)
Fund Volatility12mm−1 -0.029 (0.052) -0.024 (0.039)
Closed to New Investors 0.009 (0.014) 0.009 (0.017) 0.009 (0.015) 0.010 (0.013)
Ln(Assets)m−1 0.002 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Style Effectm -0.536*** (0.046) -0.527*** (0.047) -0.542*** (0.046) -0.542*** (0.046)
Constant 0.088 (0.060) 0.092* (0.054) 0.085 (0.055) 0.061 (0.060)
Observations 21,085 21,732 21,646 21,085
Number of Funds 732 751 751 732
Adjusted R-squared 5.48% 4.33% 4.83% 4.91%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(d) Adjusted Gross Outflows from all funds - Minimum redemption period
Adjusted Outflows (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se
Previous month
1st Quintile -0.053* (0.031) -0.082*** (0.031)
2nd Quintile -0.031* (0.018) -0.037** (0.017)
3rd Quintile 0.019 (0.016) 0.011 (0.015)
4th Quintile -0.036** (0.016) -0.050*** (0.016)
5th Quintile 0.009 (0.024) 0.018 (0.023)
Previous 6 months
1st Quintile -0.048 (0.032) -0.067* (0.034)
2nd Quintile -0.049** (0.021) -0.072*** (0.021)
3rd Quintile 0.006 (0.018) -0.012 (0.018)
4th Quintile -0.043** (0.017) -0.063*** (0.017)
5th Quintile 0.118*** (0.032) 0.082** (0.033)
Previous 12 months
1st Quintile 0.009 (0.051) -0.041 (0.051)
2nd Quintile -0.037 (0.025) -0.058** (0.026)
3rd Quintile -0.024 (0.022) -0.035 (0.022)
4th Quintile -0.045** (0.018) -0.060*** (0.018)
5th Quintile 0.009 (0.033) 0.036 (0.037)
Fund Volatilityt−1 -0.069** (0.029) -0.050 (0.048)
Fund Volatility6mt−1 0.020 (0.023) -0.011 (0.023)
Fund Volatility12mt−1 -0.026 (0.049) -0.020 (0.038)
Closed to new investors 0.011 (0.014) 0.011 (0.017) 0.010 (0.015) 0.012 (0.013)
Ln(Assets)t−1 0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Style Effectt -0.502*** (0.044) -0.488*** (0.044) -0.499*** (0.043) -0.505*** (0.044)
Constant 0.068 (0.058) 0.077 (0.051) 0.071 (0.052) 0.043 (0.058)
Observations 21,329 22,514 22,427 21,329
Number of Funds 743 786 786 743
Adjusted R-squared 5.04% 4.00% 4.43% 4.50%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(e) Adjusted Outflow from all funds - Maximum redemption period
Adjusted Outflows (2) (1) se (2) se (3) se (4) se
Previous month
1st Quintile -0.060** (0.030) -0.079** (0.032)
2nd Quintile -0.028 (0.017) -0.034** (0.017)
3rd Quintile 0.020 (0.016) 0.014 (0.015)
4th Quintile -0.042*** (0.016) -0.055*** (0.016)
5th Quintile 0.015 (0.024) 0.030 (0.024)
Previous 6 months
1st Quintile -0.027 (0.031) -0.051 (0.034)
2nd Quintile -0.060*** (0.021) -0.081*** (0.022)
3rd Quintile 0.015 (0.017) -0.000 (0.018)
4th Quintile -0.044** (0.017) -0.065*** (0.018)
5th Quintile 0.122*** (0.031) 0.100*** (0.033)
Previous 12 months
1st Quintile 0.025 (0.049) -0.017 (0.049)
2nd Quintile -0.055** (0.024) -0.077*** (0.025)
3rd Quintile 0.001 (0.022) -0.008 (0.022)
4th Quintile -0.053*** (0.018) -0.068*** (0.018)
5th Quintile 0.019 (0.031) 0.050 (0.035)
Fund Volatilitym−1 -0.065** (0.029) -0.033 (0.049)
Fund Volatility6mm−1 0.022 (0.023) -0.002 (0.023)
Fund Volatility12mm−1 -0.018 (0.049) -0.009 (0.037)
Closed to New Investors 0.013 (0.014) 0.013 (0.017) 0.013 (0.015) 0.014 (0.013)
Ln(Assets)m−1 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)
Style Effectm -0.449*** (0.042) -0.440*** (0.043) -0.449*** (0.042) -0.452*** (0.042)
Constant 0.040 (0.056) 0.046 (0.050) 0.037 (0.051) 0.016 (0.056)
Observations 21,086 21,735 21,649 21,086
Number of Funds 732 751 751 732
Adjusted R-squared 4.60% 3.66% 4.05% 4.05%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Flow-Performance Relationship - Terciles
This table reports the OLS estimates of a monthly panel data with funds’ and time fixed effects. The
dependent variable is the net inflows as a percentage of the previous month assets under management.
The independent variables are three terciles of performance in the previous month, in the previous
six months and in the previous twelve months. Past performance is measure as non-risk adjusted
after fees returns. Other controls are the realized volatility of daily returns in the previous month,
previous six months and previous twelve months; a dummy variable for funds that are closed to
new investments; the natural logarithm of the fund assets in the previous month; and style effect,
measured as the percentage net inflow to a particular category (either equity or multi-market) at
time t-1 relative to month t-2.
VARIABLES Net Inflows p-val Inflows p-val Outflows p-val
Previous month
1st Tercile 0.089*** (0.000) 0.014 (0.408) -0.040*** (0.002)
2nd Tercile 0.028** (0.019) 0.023** (0.047) -0.004 (0.607)
3rd Tercile 0.043*** (0.004) 0.018 (0.256) -0.014 (0.207)
Previous six months
1st Tercile 0.045** (0.035) -0.014 (0.567) -0.064*** (0.001)
2nd Tercile 0.070*** (0.000) 0.039*** (0.004) -0.025** (0.017)
3rd Tercile 0.097*** (0.000) 0.093*** (0.000) 0.012 (0.344)
Previous twelve months
1st Tercile 0.072*** (0.006) 0.039 (0.182) -0.034 (0.269)
2nd Tercile 0.090*** (0.000) 0.071*** (0.000) -0.037** (0.011)
3rd Tercile 0.097*** (0.000) 0.086*** (0.000) -0.038*** (0.002)
Fund Volatilitym−1 0.156*** (0.005) 0.070 (0.146) -0.171*** (0.000)
Fund Volatility6mm−1 0.007 (0.845) 0.016 (0.535) 0.038 (0.129)
Fund Volatility12mm−1 0.015 (0.721) 0.031 (0.525) -0.072** (0.014)
Closed to New Investors -0.109*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.667)
Ln(Assets)m−1 -0.024*** (0.000) -0.037*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.760)
Style Effectm−1 0.944*** (0.000) 0.398*** (0.000) -0.619*** (0.000)
Constant 0.315*** (0.000) 0.667*** (0.000) 0.120** (0.037)
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Funds’ fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 28,548 16,293 17,245
Number of Funds 674 551 586
Adjusted R-squared 13.3% 11.8% 8.9%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1.1: Flow-performance Relationship - Net Inflow
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Table 1.7: Flow-Performance Relationship: Sharpe Ratio Ranking
(a) Quantiles
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
VARIABLES Net Inflows p-val Gross Inflows p-val Gross Outflows p-val
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous month
1st Quantile 0.044 (0.293) -0.033 (0.370) -0.059* (0.089)
2nd Quantile 0.030 (0.222) 0.021 (0.397) -0.028 (0.174)
3rd Quantile 0.035* (0.097) 0.023 (0.276) -0.000 (0.997)
4th Quantile 0.040* (0.068) 0.016 (0.478) -0.020 (0.149)
5th Quantile -0.005 (0.896) 0.041 (0.246) -0.002 (0.935)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous six months
1st Quantile 0.026 (0.589) -0.024 (0.616) -0.125*** (0.003)
2nd Quantile 0.043 (0.120) 0.024 (0.287) 0.009 (0.662)
3rd Quantile 0.061** (0.013) 0.041* (0.088) -0.025 (0.187)
4th Quantile 0.072*** (0.005) 0.025 (0.351) -0.022 (0.226)
5th Quantile 0.093** (0.020) 0.117*** (0.009) -0.009 (0.710)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous twelve months
1st Quantile -0.053 (0.355) -0.010 (0.853) 0.072 (0.155)
2nd Quantile 0.135*** (0.000) 0.025 (0.396) -0.058** (0.020)
3rd Quantile 0.013 (0.597) 0.064** (0.010) -0.007 (0.726)
4th Quantile 0.095*** (0.000) 0.085*** (0.001) -0.012 (0.476)
5th Quantile 0.038 (0.320) 0.088* (0.055) 0.001 (0.977)
Closed to New Investors -0.110** (0.013) 0.008 (0.573)
Ln(Assets)m−1 -0.026*** (0.000) -0.039*** (0.000) 0.003 (0.369)
Style Effectm−1 0.992*** (0.000) 0.429*** (0.000) -0.705*** (0.000)
Constant 0.417*** (0.000) 0.750*** (0.000) 0.063 (0.285)
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Funds’ fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 28,020 16,192 17,135
Number of Funds 659 540 572
Adjusted R-squared 11.6% 11.4% 8.2%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Flow-Performance Relationship: Sharpe Ratio Ranking (Cont.)
(b) Terciles
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
VARIABLES Net Inflows p-val Gross Inflows p-val Gross Outflows p-val
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous month
1st Tercile 0.031 (0.115) -0.011 (0.535) -0.052*** (0.001)
2nd Tercile 0.044*** (0.000) 0.025** (0.021) -0.009 (0.308)
3rd Tercile 0.020 (0.179) 0.030* (0.058) -0.015 (0.114)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous six months
1st Tercile 0.033 (0.178) 0.008 (0.725) -0.059*** (0.005)
2nd Tercile 0.069*** (0.000) 0.032** (0.013) -0.015 (0.142)
3rd Tercile 0.087*** (0.000) 0.075*** (0.001) -0.018 (0.115)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous twelve months
1st Tercile 0.059** (0.030) -0.006 (0.843) -0.012 (0.653)
2nd Tercile 0.070*** (0.000) 0.071*** (0.000) -0.023** (0.044)
3rd Tercile 0.068*** (0.000) 0.092*** (0.000) -0.002 (0.887)
Closed to New Investors -0.112** (0.012) 0.007 (0.625)
Ln(Assets)m−1 -0.026*** (0.000) -0.038*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.630)
Style Effectm−1 0.995*** (0.000) 0.429*** (0.000) -0.703*** (0.000)
Constant 0.392*** (0.000) 0.733*** (0.000) 0.086 (0.153)
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Funds’ fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 28,077 16,224 17,170
Number of Funds 662 542 575
Adjusted R-squared 11.5% 11.4% 7.9%
Robust standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Flows by Type of Investor and Terciles of Performance
Panels a to c report the OLS estimates of a panel data for net inflows, inflows and outflows as a dependent variable,
respectively. Model (1) includes all funds in the sample; in model (2)-(4) funds are divided in sub-samples according to
the type of investor the funds cater to. Panel (b), gross inflows, excludes funds closed to new investment. Regressions
include both time and fund fixed effects.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4)
Qualified Institutional
VARIABLES All Funds p-val No Restriction p-val Investors p-val Investors p-val
Previous month
1st Tercile 0.089*** (0.000) 0.099*** (0.000) 0.054* (0.070) 0.062 (0.198)
2nd Tercile 0.028** (0.019) 0.026* (0.056) 0.020 (0.314) -0.018 (0.545)
3rd Tercile 0.043*** (0.004) 0.052*** (0.003) 0.018 (0.477) 0.071* (0.077)
Previous six months
1st Tercile 0.045** (0.035) 0.048* (0.055) 0.049 (0.184) 0.049 (0.400)
2nd Tercile 0.070*** (0.000) 0.075*** (0.000) 0.063*** (0.002) 0.075** (0.016)
3rd Tercile 0.097*** (0.000) 0.114*** (0.000) 0.043 (0.125) 0.075 (0.110)
Previous twelve months
1st Tercile 0.072*** (0.006) 0.080*** (0.007) 0.035 (0.405) 0.093 (0.120)
2nd Tercile 0.090*** (0.000) 0.099*** (0.000) 0.080*** (0.001) 0.077** (0.027)
3rd Tercile 0.097*** (0.000) 0.113*** (0.000) 0.067** (0.012) 0.101*** (0.009)
Fund Volatilityt−1 0.156*** (0.005) 0.139* (0.052) 0.210*** (0.002) 0.193 (0.130)
Fund Volatility6mt−1 0.007 (0.845) -0.005 (0.915) 0.017 (0.652) -0.047 (0.420)
Fund Volatility12mt−1 0.015 (0.721) 0.022 (0.695) 0.018 (0.677) 0.068 (0.363)
Closed to New Investors -0.109*** (0.003) -0.151*** (0.000) 0.023 (0.393)
Ln(Assets)m−1 -0.024*** (0.000) -0.025*** (0.000) -0.025*** (0.000) -0.034*** (0.000)
Style Effectm−1 0.944*** (0.000) 0.982*** (0.000) 0.836*** (0.000) 0.953*** (0.000)
Constant 0.315*** (0.000) 0.321*** (0.000) 0.370*** (0.000) 0.529*** (0.000)
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Funds’ fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 28,548 20,683 11,149 6,183
Number of Funds 674 496 282 163
Adjusted R-squared 13.3% 15.6% 8.7% 9.8%
Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Flows by Type of Investor and Terciles of Performance Ranked using
Sharpe Ratio
Panels a to c report the OLS estimates of a panel data for net inflows, inflows and outflows as a dependent variable,
respectively and the Sharpe ratio ranking as main independent variable. Model (1) includes all funds in the sample;
in model (2)-(4) funds are divided in sub-samples according to the type of investor the funds cater to. Panel (b),
gross inflows, excludes funds closed to new investment. Regressions include both time and fund fixed effects.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4)
Qualified Institutional
VARIABLES All Funds p-val No Restriction p-val Investors p-val Investors p-val
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous month
1st Tercile 0.031 (0.115) 0.033 (0.174) 0.031 (0.365) 0.032 (0.602)
2nd Tercile 0.044*** (0.000) 0.057*** (0.000) 0.008 (0.706) 0.000 (0.994)
3rd Tercile 0.020 (0.179) 0.019 (0.277) 0.012 (0.638) -0.022 (0.531)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous six months
1st Tercile 0.033 (0.178) 0.023 (0.418) 0.040 (0.343) 0.033 (0.599)
2nd Tercile 0.069*** (0.000) 0.073*** (0.000) 0.063*** (0.005) 0.071** (0.043)
3rd Tercile 0.087*** (0.000) 0.098*** (0.000) 0.071** (0.014) 0.117*** (0.009)
Sharpe ratio ranking, previous twelve months
1st Tercile 0.059** (0.030) 0.059* (0.068) 0.083* (0.050) 0.128** (0.026)
2nd Tercile 0.070*** (0.000) 0.088*** (0.000) 0.047** (0.045) 0.071** (0.040)
3rd Tercile 0.068*** (0.000) 0.080*** (0.000) 0.034 (0.196) 0.037 (0.376)
Closed to New Investors -0.112** (0.012) -0.165*** (0.000) 0.033 (0.108)
Ln(Assets)m−1 -0.026*** (0.000) -0.027*** (0.000) -0.027*** (0.000) -0.037*** (0.000)
Style Effectm−1 0.995*** (0.000) 1.037*** (0.000) 0.871*** (0.000) 0.925*** (0.000)
Constant 0.392*** (0.000) 0.408*** (0.000) 0.444*** (0.000) 0.652*** (0.000)
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Funds’ fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 28,077 20,330 10,965 6,080
Number of Funds 662 486 275 157
Adjusted R-squared 11.5% 13.4% 8.1% 9.1%
Robust p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
Contract-implied and flow-induced
incentives in the asset management
industry
2.1 Introduction
Agency problems due to delegated portfolio management have been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature. In principle, if fund managers are compensated based on
their performance, they should exert higher effort and generate higher (risk-adjusted)
returns. However such contracts may have a perverse effect as well, namely, inducing
managers to take excess risk. This could well exacerbate the agency problem instead
of offering a correction (Palomino and Prat, 2003). This problem may arise even in
the absence of any explicit contract. The tournament feature of the money manage-
ment industry, in which the best performing funds reap most of the funds flowing to
the industry, generates an implicit incentive for the fund manager to beat the com-
petition over the year. Funds that are lagging relative to their peers during mid-year
would then have an incentive to shift risk towards the end of the year, regardless of
the shareholders’ preferences (Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996).
This paper contributes to the literature on incentives and risk taking behavior of
fund managers by disentangling the effect due to the implicit contract generated by
the tournament feature within the industry, from the explicit remuneration contract
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offered by the asset management company to the fund managers. In particular, I
restrict attention to funds that pay bonus to their managers every six months (viz.,
July and January) instead of every end of year. As portfolio managers face the same
contract-implied incentive every six months and the incentive generated by the flow-
performance is stronger in the end of the year, differences in risk-taking between
the second and the fourth quarters are due to the tournament effect. The results
suggest that funds engage in a tournament, but not in the way the literature suggest:
fund families behave strategically, not only transferring gains to the best performing
funds as Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) and
others suggest, but moving risk from the best funds to the worst. In addition, the
relative position of a fund relative to the other funds in the same family is much more
important to determine risk-shifting than its position relative to other funds in the
industry.
The empirical literature in this field usually treats funds as stand-alone entities
with no strategic behavior at the fund level. In most cases, however, a fund is part of
a family of funds. The family collects all the fees paid by the investors and pays all the
costs that do not arise from the trading activities of the funds such as rent, salaries,
IT etc. Whatever is left is then redistributed to the fund managers at specific times
of the year.1 This is the variable component of the fund manager’s remuneration (the
bonus) and I will assume that it is, at least partly, linked to the fund manager’s past
performance.
There are thus two layers of contracting: one between the investors and the family,
and another between the family and the traders. As fees are proportional to assets
under management, the goal of the top management is to maximize assets under
management, i.e., net inflows. As for the traders, they just want to maximize their
1In this chapter, I will use fund managers, portfolio managers and traders indistinguishably. The
same goes for company, top management company or family.
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own payoff. In general, the literature on fund tournament theory assumes that funds
engage in an yearly tournament for flows against other funds in the industry: funds
that are lagging relative to the market have an incentive to shift risk towards the end
of the year in order to climb a few positions on the ranking. However, fund managers
also engage in an internal tournament against other managers in the same family for
a share of the profits. As in general traders receive their bonus every January relative
to their performance in the previous year, they also have an incentive to shift risk
towards the end of the year. As a result, there are two types of tournament affecting
the risk taking behaviour of a fund towards the end of the year. Most empirical
papers in this area fail to recognize this feature.
The results in this paper relate to the literature on incentives and delegated port-
folio management and more precisely to the few papers that analyze family fund
structure and strategic competition at the family level. Massa (1998) show that hav-
ing a star fund generates a positive spillover for all the funds belonging to the same
family. Nanda et al. (2004) investigate the consequences of such spillover and argue
that it may induce some families to pursue a star-creating strategy, by increasing the
cross-return variance or the number of funds in the family. Guedj and Papastaikoudi
(2004) demonstrate that there is performance persistence for funds belonging to the
same family which increases with the number of funds a family manages. This is con-
sistent with families allocating resources in proportion to fund performance. Gaspar
et al. (2006) show that families engage in cross-subsidization of returns, transferring
performance across funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits,
hurting the individual investor.
The previous papers focus on the decision of the top management of a family and
study whether they affect the performance of the funds they manage. Nonetheless,
they still assume that funds belonging to the same family are coordinated entities,
with no strategic interaction between them. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) analyze the
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behavior of funds within a family and show that they engage in an internal tournament
against each other. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) find that the effects are particularly
pronounced ‘among manager of funds with high expense ratios, which are managed
by a single manager and which belong to large families’.
The literature on tournament is, by contrast, vast. Brown et al. (1996) test
the tournament theory and find evidence that mid-year losers do indeed increase
the risk of their portfolio in the second half of the year. Koski and Pontiff (1999)
find similar results after calculating several measures of riskiness, including the total
volatility, market beta and idiosyncratic risk of the funds’ returns. Busse (2001) and
Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005) point out however that the above difference-in-
risk tests are not robust to cross-sectional correlation. This is in contrast with the
panel framework I employ, which explicitly controls for the covariance between the
funds’ returns. It also does not affect studies based on portfolio holdings, whose
results corroborate mine. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that fund
managers lagging behind have an incentive to gamble by taking more unsystematic
risk, whereas winning funds would lock-in their gains by indexing more.
Chen and Pennacchi (2009) develop a model where they show that tournament
competition induces losers to deviate from the benchmark, increasing the tracking
error of the fund, rather than the volatility of total returns. Their results suggest
that losers tend to decrease their total volatility in the second half of the year whilst
increasing at the same time their tracking error. As before, this is well in line with
the findings in this paper.
Reed and Wu (2005) show that mutual fund managers respond much more to year-
to-date performance relative to the market index than relative to each other. Fund
managers reduce risk after beating the S&P500, but not after beating the median re-
turn of the competitors. This is not surprising in that fund managers are compensated
based on their performance relative to a benchmark. Similarly, Basak, Pavlova and
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Shapiro (2007) also use returns data to examine whether beating a benchmark implies
risk shifting. They develop a model in which implicit incentives induce a risk-averse
manager to take more or less risk depending on her degree of risk aversion.
Changing risk as a response to past performance should not depend on the time
of the year. If one assumes that a fund’s level of risk also relates to performance
calculated over calendar years as some papers show (see, among others, Koski and
Pontiff (1999), Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), then the flow-performance relationship
will generate an implicit incentive that can affect the risk taking behavior of a fund
specifically towards the end of the year.
In most countries, bonus payments occur at the beginning of the year relative to
the performance in the previous year, and hence it is impossible to empirically dis-
tinguish risk shifting due to the compensation contract from the one due to incentive
structure implied by the flow-performance relationship. Given the bi-annual com-
pensation scheme in Brazil, contract-induced changes in risk may happen not only
towards the end of the year, but also on the second quarter of the year. Of course,
there is always a subjective component in the bonus determination. Accordingly,
fund/portfolio managers could endogenize this feature, facing in practice a different
incentive in the second half of the year. This means that differences in the risk-
taking behavior between the second and the fourth quarter of the year are due to the
incentives implicit in the flow-performance relation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes different measures of risk
shifting and the main variables used in the empirical model. Section 2.3 describes
the data and the institutional framework. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Measuring risk shifting
There are two general ways to measure the riskiness of a fund. The first employs
returns data only, whereas the second also requires portfolio holdings data. The data
set I employ allows me to calculate risk shifting in both ways and hence to compare
their results. The three main question are then (1) who changes risk, (2) how they
change risk, and (3) in response to what. The rest of this section examine these issues
in more detail.
2.2.1 How do funds change their risk?
Funds can increase their total risk by either taking more systematic risk, i.e. tilting
towards assets with higher beta, or by taking more idiosyncratic risk, i.e. decreasing
the level of diversification in their portfolio. However, if funds measure their per-
formance against a specific benchmark, as Chen and Pennacchi (2009) and Basak
et al. (2007) point out, the way to increase their performance relative to this bench-
mark is not to increase total risk, but to increase the tracking error. The argument
is similar to Brown et al.’s (1996) reasoning. Mid-year losers that want to improve
their performance relative to their peers need not only to take more risk, but also to
take more risk than mid-year winners. This would mean that total fund volatility is
not necessarily the appropriate measure of risk to use when analyzing risk shifting.
Increasing tracking error indeed does not necessarily translates into a rise in the total
volatility.
To answer the question on how funds shift risk, I employ both total volatility
and tracking error as dependent variables and then check if the regression results
differ or not. If there is a change in tracking error and/or total volatility, the signs
of the changes will give a hint of what funds are actually doing. If total volatility
increases, it can either mean that the fund’s diversification has decreased or that
the fund is taking more systematic risk. If, on the other hand, the tracking error
54
increases, it will then mean that the market beta of the fund is moving further away
from one, i.e., the active beta is increasing in magnitude. The less tracking error,
the more benchmarking, but, all else being equal, the fund can be decreasing or
increasing total volatility depending on whether the original beta was above or below
one, respectively.
Alternatively, one can also investigate risk shifting from funds’ portfolio holdings
by looking at the market betas of the individual assets that compose the portfolio.
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) suggest a measure of active risk-shifting calculated
from portfolio holdings that captures when a fund migrates to assets with lower or
higher beta. Although I have access to the holdings of the funds in the database, the
sample is much shorter than the one used for most of the analysis. I will, however,
use this measure in section 2.4.4 as a further test.
2.2.2 Risk shifting and past performance
The main objective of this paper is to disentangle the effect of the direct compensation
contract from the implicit incentive generated by the flow-performance relationship.
As both flows and the bonus respond to past performance, I need at least two distinct
measures of past performance to test whether they induce a different risk-taking
behaviour.
The choice of the dependent variables reflects the time span over which the fund
manager and the management company are evaluated. The management company is
evaluated by the shareholders and other outside investors and its payoff is expressed by
an increase or decrease in net inflows. Fund managers are evaluated by the company
and their payoff is just the bonus they get on top of any fixed salary they might already
receive. Note that, in this setting, the asset management company first collects the
fees, pays all the company’s costs and, only then, redistribute whatever is left to the
portfolio managers. The key aspect is that the contract does not specify the exact
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percentage fund/portfolio managers will receive of total fees which means that fund
managers and top management incentives are not necessarily aligned.
Fund managers receive their bonus every January and July relative to the pre-
vious six months. Unfortunately, I have no information on the contracts the top
management offers to fund managers, but, if the top management wants incentives
to be aligned, bonus will be linked to the fund manager’s performance relative to the
market as this is the main determinant of net inflows. Moreover, acknowledging a
competition between fund managers within the same family, I will introduce a second
measure of performance that captures an internal competition for bonus.
In order to account for the features previously described, I first calculate the
fund return over the January-to-date period for the first half of the year and over
July-to-date period for the second half of the year and then generate two different
rankings: one for the company and another for the industry. For the first ranking,
for each month and company, I separate funds into terciles; T1(JTD) being the worst
and T3(JTD) the best performing. JTD stands for either January-to-date or July-to-
date depending on whether month t belongs to the first or second half of the year.
Ideally, one should use returns before fees to rank the funds, but this is unfortunately
not available in the database. Accordingly, I use net-of-fees returns instead. For the
second ranking, for each month, funds are split into quintiles; Q1(JTD) aggregates
the worst performing, whereas Q5(JTD) the best within their segment (i.e., equity or
multi-market) according to their net-of-fee returns. It would have been preferable to
use the same number of quantiles for both measures, but some families are just not
big enough to divided in five groups. For the sake of robustness, I look into different
quantiles without any major change in the results.
The choice of a performance dependent variable that captures the incentive faced
by the asset management company is not as straightforward. Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) and Brown et al. (1996) among others claim that, if official rankings are only
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released annually, funds should be mostly concerned with their performance within a
specific year. This means that returns since January (year-to-date) would probably
be the most appropriate measure. However, using exactly the same sample as in this
paper, Bertol-Domingues (2011) finds that the past 12-month performance explains
most of the net inflows to a fund. This measure has also the advantage of providing
an incentive every month that, in theory, does not depend on the time of the year.
As before, I divide funds into quintiles according to their 12-month performance.
The worst performing funds are in Q1(12m), whereas Q5(12m) consists of the best
performing funds. Note that I differentiate the notation for the performance quintiles
by superscripts. As previously mentioned, JTD stands for either January-to-date or
July-to-date, whereas 12m refers to the longer horizon of 12 months.
2.2.3 Funds’ characteristics and other controls
As funds in the same family compete against each other for a share of the total
fees, the structure and some characteristics of the asset management can affect the
competition and the risk-taking behavior of the fund managers. Huang, Wei and
Yan (2007) report that funds in smaller families usually have a more convex flow-
performance relationship.
The number of funds within a family also plays a role. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008)
show that funds that belong to a large family, i.e., with more funds, don’t behave
as funds that belong to a small family. More specifically, mid-year winners in a big
family tend to increase risk less than mid-year losers, whereas, in small families, the
exact opposite occurs. They, however, also notice that adjustments in risk are bigger
in bigger families. This is consistent with Huang et al.’s (2011) evidence that the
bigger the fund family, as measured by total net assets, the more the fund shifts risk.
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2.3 Data description
2.3.1 Sample selection
I use a database of Brazilian funds provided by Quantum that comprises daily infor-
mation on share value, total net assets, number of shareholders, inflows and outflows,
as well as monthly portfolio holdings for both mutual and hedge funds.2 The data
set contains information on both long and short positions on every security in the
portfolio, including derivatives. It also has important information on the fund such
as style/segment, age, fees, minimum investment amount and the type of client the
fund caters to. For the last two and a half years of data, there is also information
on the exact number of shares each fund bought and sold over any given month from
which I can back out the exact turnover of the fund.3
The database is extremely rich and has many advantages compared to the usual
data in the extant literature. First, it includes monthly portfolio holdings rather than
quarterly. As pointed out by Elton et al. (2010), the sampling frequency of the data
has a significant impact on the results. Quarterly data misses all the intra-quarter
trades, and adding more information might change, or even reverse, the previous
findings. Moreover, portfolio holdings information includes all positions rather than
restricting attention to long positions in equity. Second, since 2007, Brazilian funds
have been required to report not only the net position at the end of each month but
also how much they bought and sold of each security within that month. Although
we still do not know when the trades happened within the month, it gives us a more
much precise measure of turnover and indicates how active the funds are. Last, but
not least, the database includes hedge funds. In general, hedge funds are required
to provide very little information on their activities. Under the Brazilian regulation,
2 According to ICI, in the last quarter of 2010, Brazil ranked sixth in the ranking of mutual
funds behind USA, Luxembourg, France, Australia, and Ireland.
3 For more information on Brazilian fund data, see Bertol-Domingues (2011). See also Varga
and Wengert (2009) for a thorough discussion of the Brazilian fund industry and its legislation.
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they are required to disclose similar information as mutual funds. They are, however,
still free to trade in all markets and to take short positions. As a consequence, it is
possible to evaluate under the same regulatory framework the risk-shifting behavior
of hedge funds relative to mutual funds conditional on the funds’ characteristics. One
main difference between Brazilian hedge funds and their counterpart elsewhere is that
funds domiciliated in Brazil cannot borrow cash in order to increase leverage. This
can significantly decrease their level of risk, but also limit their ability to arbitrage.
For the purpose of this paper, the main advantage of this database is that Brazilian
funds normally pay bonus every six months instead of every year: in July (relative
to period between January and June) and in January (relative to the period between
July and December). This is a crucial feature because it allows disentangling the
incentives faced by the fund management company from the short-term incentive
faced by the fund/portfolio manager. Assuming the compensation contract does not
change considerably over time, the fund manager will face the same contract-induced
incentive every six months. Whereas, in theory, fund management companies will
have a constant incentive every month given by the flow-performance relationship
(see Bertol-Domingues, 2011). If we take into account the fact that funds are also
evaluated based on their annual performance, there is a tournament to be played and
won every year (see, among others, Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
As the end of the year approaches, both the fund manager and the company could
have an incentive to alter the risk of the portfolio.
I focus the analysis on actively managed domestic funds, which consist of equity
and multi-market funds, excluding fund-of-funds. As determined by the CVM (i.e.,
the Brazilian SEC), multi-market funds can trade in any market with no restriction,
whereas equity funds are required to invest 80% of their assets in equity. From this
sample, I then further exclude balanced, bond, international and index funds as well
as funds that manage less than $5 million or with up to three shareholders for over
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50% of the sample.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The final sample includes 925 distinct funds and 42,460 valid fund-month observations
from December 1996 to June 2009. The number of funds ranges from 140 in December
1997 to 667 in June 2009. The database has no survivorship bias, though there is
some evidence of backfill bias from 1997 to 2000 (Bertol-Domingues, 2011). Daily
information on returns, share value and assets under management are available since
December 1996. Daily information on the number of shareholders, gross inflows and
gross outflows per fund start in January 2005. Monthly information on portfolio
holdings start in January 2005 and information on the monthly turnover is available
from January 2007.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for several fund’s characteristics. The median
fund is just under five years old, manages around R$114 million, with just under 2,000
shareholders, and yields 1.8% a month with an average volatility of 4.9% and tracking
error of 7.1%. It receives a typical inflow of 9.1% over a month and suffers an outflow
of 5.5% of the total net assets. As and when a fund is liquidated, both the net flow
and the outflow are set to -100%. Both inflows and outflows are very volatile. I thus
winsorize them at the 99.5% quantile.
2.4 Panel-regression analysis of risk shifting
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate how past performance and funds’ characteristics affect
the general risk-taking behavior of a fund as measured by the total volatility, their
beta and their idiosyncratic volatility, respectively. The fund’s beta and idiosyncratic
volatility are monthly, calculated from daily return. The fund’s monthly volatility
is calculated by summing squared daily returns as suggested in Merton (1980) and
French et al. (1987):
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σf,m =
√
21
∑Nm
t=1 r
2
f,t
Nm − 1
Note that dividing the realized variance by the number of trading days within the
month yields a measure that does not depend on the length of the month (otherwise,
volatility in March would on average exceed that in February, say).
Fund managers that decide to lock in their gains can do three things: decrease
the absolute value of the beta of their portfolio; increase its level of diversification;
and/or decrease the proportion of risky assets relative to cash or cash equivalents.
These three options are, of course, not mutually exclusive. If fund managers are
however competing against the other fund managers in the industry, the best option
might not be to lock their absolute return, but their relative return. In this case,
instead of decreasing the absolute value of the beta of their portfolio, |β|, they will
track the benchmark index more closely, i.e. they will decrease |β − 1|. As funds have
0 < β < 1 in over 80% of the time, increasing β is then equivalent to benchmarking
more.
The main objective of this paper is to link changes in volatility over the year to
past performance, especially at close-to-bonus-payment times. Thus, I develop a panel
data model with both fund and time-fixed effects and measures of past performance
that reflect either the contract generated incentive or the implicit incentive produced
by the fund flows along with other controls. I then compare the results for total
volatility and tracking error so as to pin down exactly how fund managers change the
riskiness of their portfolio.
There are three main sets of regressors in the baseline model: T1(JTD), . . . , T3(JTD)
denote the fund ranking within the family of funds over the January/July-to-date pe-
riod, Q1(JTD), . . . , Q5(JTD) refer to the fund ranking in the whole industry over the
same time period, and Q1(12m), . . . , Q5(12m) describe the fund ranking in the whole
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industry over the previous twelve months. The JTD window reflects the fact that
fund managers receive their bonus every six months and hence the related perfor-
mance measures aim to capture the contract-induced risk-taking behavior of the
fund/portfolio manager due to the internal and external competitions. The 12-
month performance quintile attempts to account for the incentive implied by the
flow-performance relationship. To avoid obvious endogeneity issues, all regressors are
lagged.
If funds indeed strategically alter their risk in response to incentives, I should
observe a change in the level of risk in the second and in the last quarter of the year.
Changes in the second quarter are mainly bonus-driven, whereas changes in the fourth
quarter will also depend on the flow-performance incentive. In order to identify these
changes I have created two dummy variables that are interacted with the explanatory
variables: one for the contract, which is equal to one for quarters 2 and 4, and another
for the flow-performance relationship that is equal to one only in the fourth quarter.
In particular, I expect variables that directly affect the flow-performance relationship,
i.e. segment rankings, to be relatively more important on the last quarter of the year.
In what follows, I will discuss the results for each of the three main explanatory
variables. Note that within the JTD window, the performance terciles are about in-
ternal competition within the asset management company, whereas the performance
quintiles refer to external competition within the segment of the fund industry. But,
despite the distinction between internal and external competition, they are both es-
sentially about the contract-generated incentives faced by the portfolio manager.
2.4.1 Contract-generated incentive
Internal competition
In general, contracts induce a general increase in idiosyncratic risk, whereas the im-
plicit flow-related incentive lead to a general decrease in total risk and idiosyncratic
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risk. Results are however not symmetric for the top and bottom funds.
One of the most important results from Table 2.2 is that the family internal
competition matters. The competition within the fund family (T (JTD)) bears no
contamination from the flow-generated incentive and hence any difference in risk
between the second and fourth quarters is presumably due to an end-of-year effect.
Although there is no reason to believe that investors keep track of what happens in
June, final year numbers will show up in any fund report. Nanda et al. (2004), Guedj
and Papastaikoudi (2004) and Gaspar et al. (2006), for example, show that families
engage in cross-fund subsidization, shifting performance between their funds in order
to generate a star effect. Following this reasoning, families would use the second half
of the year to achieve any objectives they might have. The second quarter effect is
exclusively due to the bonus payment proximity, whereas changes in the last quarter
are also driven by the top management strategy. The riskiness of the portfolio and its
determinants change quite actively in response to the fund ranking within its family.
In order to properly analyze the results, I will use Table 2.3 instead of Table 2.2 which
does not impose any constraint on the level of risk on the first and third quarters.
In the second quarter of the year, both bottom and top quintile funds increase the
β of their portfolio by a similar amount, but the worst funds also show a 4% decrease
in the level of idiosyncratic risk. The latter indicates that, close to bonus time, funds
that are performing poorly relative to other funds in the family benchmark more. This
is in line with Basak et al. (2007). In their paper, they argue that a less risk averse
manager will take on more systematic risk and bet on improving their performance
when the benchmark increases. If the benchmark falls, they will just be losing with
all the others.
The results for the second half of the year are more striking. The worst funds
increase both β and total volatility, in such way that tracking error decreases. Total
volatility decreases by around 3% every quarter and tracking error by 5.6% and 4%
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in the third and fourth quarters, respectively. The best performing funds do the
exact opposite. They have total volatility 6% lower in the second half od the year,
with tracking error 7% higher. As before, the bottom tercile is benchmarking more,
increasing total volatility, whereas the top funds are locking in their gains tilting their
portfolio towards assets with lower β.
This mirror-image pattern between top and bottom performers may indicate that
families have a target level of risk for their funds as suggested by Daniel and Wermers
(2001). This is a possibility that needs to be further investigated.
External competition
Table 2.2 shows that the worst performing funds in their segment on the JTD window
take on average 3.3% more idiosyncratic risk than their peers, boosting it even more
in the last quarter of the year (9% increase on average). Top performing funds
decrease both β and idiosyncratic risk (the latter by -4.9%) in anticipation of the
bonus, but they do the opposite close to the end of the year with idiosyncratic risk
increasing by 8.1% on average relative to the second quarter of the year. All in all,
performance-linked contracts induce top and bottom funds to decrease β with top
funds also decreasing idiosyncratic risk.
The Q(JTD) variable covers the period over which bonus is decided, while it also
captures a competition between funds that affects the flow-performance relationship:
even if one assumes that investor are interested in the fund’s return year-to-date
or that they continuously evaluate funds, there is no reason to suppose that they
keep track of the return up to June or July-to-date. One of the arguments of this
paper is that bonus will have a component that reflects the performance relative to
the industry and this is what this variable is capturing. Is it interesting to observe
that the implicit incentive generated by the flow-performance relationship induce the
top funds in the JTD window to increase the total volatility of their portfolio by
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almost 5% (by means of increases in both β and idiosyncratic risk). Funds in the top
quintile of the July-to-date ranking have been doing very well recently. When fund
managers (and the top management) realize the success of their trading strategy,
they might have an extra incentive to boost their positions in the end of the year
to gain even more ground relative to the other funds. This, however, only explains
the increase in idiosyncratic risk, but not necessarily the change in β in the last
quarter of the year. Interestingly, changing the model to include, in the second half
of the year, both year-to-date and July-to-date returns (excluding past 12 months)
does not affect the coefficients of JTD ranking.4 This further indicates that, even
if the tournament within the industry happens on an yearly basis, fund managers
compensation is indeed more closely linked to the performance in the half-year.
Overall, there is a strong evidence that the worst performing funds gamble for
survival, with a 9% increase in idiosyncratic risk in the last quarter of the year, and
that the best performing funds do engage in a tournament against other funds in the
industry.
2.4.2 Flow-generated incentive
Next, I turn the attention to shifts in risk due to the flow-performance relationship.
These changes are about the drive for long-run performance that asset management
firms attempt to instill in their fund/portfolio managers so as to attract more inflows
to their funds.
The first thing to notice from Table 2.2 is that the better the performance of
the fund in the past 12 months, the smaller the fund’s β, the larger its idiosyncratic
risk and its tracking error without affecting overall risk. The increase in tracking
error is only significant for the top funds, though. If funds were just locking in their
absolute gains, one would observe a decrease in β and subsequent increase in tracking
4These results are available upon request.
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error, but not an increase in idiosyncratic risk. This pattern is consistent with the
reasoning behind Cohen, Polk and Silli (2010): funds whose best ideas are proving
particularly good can improve their performance with a more concentrated portfolio.
As best performing ideas are most effective in illiquid and unpopular stocks, the more
concentrated portfolio not only would have higher idiosyncratic volatility but also a
lower β.
The impact of past 12 months performance on risk-taking behavior over the year
is weak. Table 2.3 shows some evidence that poor performing funds increase idiosyn-
cratic volatility in the last quarter and that the best funds, decrease it. All things
considered, despite the time frame of the tournament among all funds, the timing
of the bonus payment is dominant. Two major conclusions arise from the previous
analysis: (1) The tournament within the family is more important for fund managers
than the competition with other funds in the industry and (2) the convexity of the
flow-performance relationship does not necessarily induce funds to gamble, but it does
induce families to behave strategically, cross-subsidizing funds not only in return, but
also in risk.
2.4.3 Monthly data
Table 2.4 and Figures 2.1 to 2.4 show similar results with monthly dummies instead
of quarter dummies. As the most important periods relate to the second and fourth
quarters, I have expanded these quarters into months keeping quarter dummies for
the first (constant) and the third quarters. Results are similar to the ones obtained
before: the family ranking displays the most significant variables with the worst
performing funds in the family increasing both total risk and the β of their portfolio
towards the end of the year while the best funds do the exact opposite.
One curious result worth mentioning is that funds do not change abruptly their
level of risk on the last month of the year. Actually, if I expand the model to include
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all month dummies (results not reported), I notice that managers of top (bottom)
performing funds start decreasing (increasing) the level of risk of their portfolio from
as early as August (September). Top performers accelerate the rate of change from
September onwards. This is further evidence that changes in risk in the second half
of the year are not just due to a tournament effect where funds compete in return,
but due to a more elaborate strategy defined for the whole family of funds.
2.4.4 Risk-shifting and portfolio holdings
The previous analysis was all based on realized volatility and information extracted
from returns data. Following Huang et al. (2011), I will now employ a portfolio-based
measure of risk-shifting, RSf,t, to analyze whether I can extract further information
about changes in risk. Unfortunately, portfolio holdings have only been disclosed
since 2006 and as the measure suggested Huang et al. (2011) requires at least 2 years
of data to be calculated, the time spanned by this measure is significantly shorter
than the one used in the previous sections.5 The risk shifting measure is calculated
as below:
RSf,t = σ
H
f,t − σRf,t. (2.1)
The realized volatility σRf,t is a backward-looking measure of the total risk of the
fund over the previous 24 months.6 On the other hand, the portfolio-holdings-based
volatility σHf,t is forward looking in that it captures the target volatility of the fund. It
is computed as the sample standard deviation of the return of a hypothetical portfolio
that holds the most recently disclosed fund positions over the previous 24 months.
Alternatively, one can compute it by the square root of the variance of a portfolio
5The next chapter includes a detailed explanation of the drawbacks of this measure.
6 Huang et al. (2011) use the past 36 months to evaluate the intended risk level of the fund. The
data employed in this paper spans a shorter period of time and hence the shorter window.
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with the weights ωf,t given by the fund’s holdings positions:
σHf,t =
√
V ar(ω′f,tRt) =
√
ω′f,tV ar(Rt)ωf,t =
√
ω′f,tΣtωf,t (2.2)
where Σt is the realized variance-covariance matrix of the assets returns.
The key aspect of this methodology is that, as it uses overlapping time periods,
it only measures active risk shifting. For instance, if a fund does not change the
portfolio composition over time, the risk-shifting measure will be zero even if the
risk of the individual assets is time varying. This means that RSf,t does not vary
with changes in the market conditions. Huang et al. (2011) point out that funds that
decrease their total risk on average increase non-equity holdings, and decrease market
beta and idiosyncratic volatility. Funds that increase total risk operate in the exact
opposite direction.
Table 2.5 displays how the risk-measure reacts to past performance. The explana-
tory variables are the same as in the previous models as in Table 2.2 with a dummy
variable for the second and fourth quarter and another for the fourth quarter only.
Unfortunately, the results are not very elucidating. Nevertheless, family rankings are
still the most significant variables: funds in the top tercile slightly decrease the level
of risk in the second quarter and increase it on the fourth. The changes are, however,
not economically significant.
It is also possible to use portfolio holdings to evaluate how funds actually change
their risk by looking at changes in portfolio composition. I split assets in equity (long
and short positions), derivatives, and cash and bonds. Probably due to the short
sample, I could not find any result and coefficients are not reported.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I claim that fund managers and families may have different objective
functions and that they behave strategically in order to increase their payoffs. Funds
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compete for bonus against other funds not just in the industry, but more importantly,
in their own family. Moreover, the tournament funds engage in with other funds in
the industry is not just played by them, but also by their families top management.
In the US, bonus is paid every year. As the tournament effect gets stronger as
December approaches, both funds and families have an incentive to shift risk in the
end of the year which makes these two incentives hard to disentangle.
In this paper I use a unique dataset with funds that pay bonus every six months
instead of every year. I can, thus, separate the effect of bonus payment from the
tournament effect. I show that the main determinant of changes in risk is not the
fund’s position relative to the market, but its position relative to the other funds in
its family. There is no particular pattern for the first half of the year, close to mid-
year bonus payment, but results for the second half of the year are consistent with
families actively managing funds, transferring risk from the best performing funds
to the worst. The previous literature had already shown that families engage in a
cross-subsidization of returns in order to favor the best performer. Here, I show that
families not only want to generate a start fund in terms of returns, but also in terms
of risk. These results are striking as they add a new dimension in the tournament
played by funds. They need to be further investigated and the analysis of the funds’
portfolio holdings might shed some light in this issue.
69
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table includes summary statistics for the funds included in the sample. In order
to calculate total net assets, I took the average on the cross-section for every fund
in the sample every are end of year and then took the average over the time-series.
Monthly volatility is calculated from daily returns. Average number of funds per
family is calculated first taking the average per family and then the average over all
families.
Mean Median St. Dev.
Total net assets (in million) 126.8 113.9 40.4
Investor return (%) 1.4 1.8 3.4
Monthly volatility (%) 3.8 3.2 2.0
Tracking error (%) 7.1 7.0 4.3
CAPM Beta 0.31 0.10 0.33
Number of shareholders 1778 1965 790
Age (years) 4.8 4.9 0.3
Outflows (%) 5.3 5.5 2.5
Inflows (%) 9.9 9.1 5.8
Net inflows (%) 5.6 4.5 5.2
Average number of funds per family 4.5 2.2 8.5
Number of valid funds 1003
Number of fund families 219
Number of valid observations 65,374
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Table 2.2: Risk-Shifting and Past Performance
This table depicts the result of a panel data regression of log of total fund monthly volatility, beta, log of
idiosyncratic volatility and of tracking error volatility on dummies of past performance, quarter dummies, their
interactions, and other control variables. Regressions include the first lag of the dependent variable and time
dummies only for specific crisis periods. Monthly volatility is calculated from daily returns. For each dummy
variable, i.variable = 1 when variable = i. The interaction variables i.variable1 *j.variable2 = 1 when variable1
= i and variable2 = j. Funds are ranked within their management company by their performance January-
to-date in the first half of the year, and July-to-date in the second half of the year, and divided in terciles of
performance (T (JTD)). Funds are also ranked by style and return relative to all the other funds in the industry
over the same period of time and divided into quintiles (Q(JTD)). Finally, funds are ranked by style and return
relative to all the other funds in the industry for their performance over the past twelve months and also divided
into quintiles (Q(12m)). The latter variable captures the flow-generated incentive whereas the other two reflect
the direct contract-generated incentive.
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
Dependent Var.t−1 0.590*** (0.000) 0.548*** (0.000) 0.602*** (0.000) 0.446*** (0.000)
Quarter=2 or 4 0.008 (0.558) 0.005 (0.211) 0.073*** (0.003) -0.064*** (0.000)
Quarter=4 -0.049*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.701) -0.100*** (0.000) -0.030** (0.024)
1.T JTD 0.028*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.005) 0.030** (0.025) -0.033*** (0.000)
3.T JTD -0.016* (0.064) -0.000 (0.977) -0.000 (0.973) 0.026*** (0.000)
1.T JTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.037** (0.016) -0.003 (0.416) -0.042* (0.079) 0.030*** (0.003)
3.T JTD*Quarter=2 or 4 0.042*** (0.000) 0.017*** (0.000) -0.023 (0.289) -0.050*** (0.000)
1.T JTD*Quarter=4 0.084*** (0.000) 0.008* (0.062) 0.017 (0.484) -0.041*** (0.001)
3.T JTD*Quarter=4 -0.070*** (0.000) -0.020*** (0.000) 0.031 (0.176) 0.082*** (0.000)
1.QJTD 0.011 (0.323) 0.000 (0.911) 0.033* (0.063) 0.020** (0.011)
2.QJTD -0.011 (0.272) -0.003 (0.330) -0.002 (0.901) 0.005 (0.496)
4.QJTD -0.017* (0.066) -0.001 (0.735) -0.018 (0.228) -0.011 (0.137)
5.QJTD -0.030*** (0.005) -0.005 (0.170) 0.002 (0.927) -0.006 (0.436)
1.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.008 (0.668) -0.010* (0.087) -0.024 (0.403) 0.002 (0.907)
2.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.004 (0.809) -0.004 (0.422) -0.016 (0.558) 0.020 (0.112)
4.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.007 (0.675) -0.001 (0.884) -0.024 (0.364) 0.005 (0.698)
5.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.023 (0.185) -0.011* (0.064) -0.049* (0.093) 0.015 (0.292)
1.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.031 (0.198) 0.008 (0.246) 0.090*** (0.008) 0.028* (0.090)
2.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.013 (0.452) 0.008 (0.106) 0.046 (0.115) -0.011 (0.435)
4.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.014 (0.395) 0.004 (0.462) 0.030 (0.271) 0.011 (0.422)
5.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.049** (0.027) 0.015** (0.014) 0.081*** (0.005) -0.000 (0.983)
Observations 31,445 31,447 31,447 31,449
Number of Funds 737 737 737 737
Adjusted R-squared 0.4032 0.2731 0.3658 0.5049
Robust standard errors, clustered by fund, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.2: Risk-Shifting and Past Performance (Cont.)
Continuation from the previous page. LN(AUMt−1) is the natural log of total net assets of a fund. LN(No.
funds in familyt−1) in the log of the number of funds each asset management company manages included in
the sample. LN(Total AUM familyt−1) is the total assets under management of the family for the funds in the
sample (excludes fixed income funds).
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
1.Q12m 0.027 (0.109) -0.005 (0.221) 0.030 (0.216) 0.002 (0.807)
2.Q12m 0.008 (0.397) -0.005* (0.097) 0.026* (0.097) 0.005 (0.566)
4.Q12m 0.002 (0.853) -0.006** (0.028) 0.032** (0.019) 0.008 (0.323)
5.Q12m 0.003 (0.808) -0.015*** (0.000) 0.056*** (0.000) 0.025*** (0.001)
1.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.023 (0.392) 0.016*** (0.003) -0.036 (0.292) -0.003 (0.853)
2.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.007 (0.660) 0.009* (0.054) -0.016 (0.521) -0.027** (0.028)
4.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.010 (0.469) 0.001 (0.890) -0.053** (0.021) 0.006 (0.606)
5.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.004 (0.819) 0.009* (0.095) -0.040* (0.085) -0.001 (0.931)
1.Q12m*Quarter=4 0.006 (0.804) -0.012* (0.050) 0.074** (0.034) 0.010 (0.521)
2.Q12m*Quarter=4 -0.022 (0.200) -0.003 (0.551) -0.006 (0.848) 0.022 (0.136)
4.Q12m*Quarter=4 0.016 (0.340) 0.004 (0.436) 0.050* (0.086) -0.013 (0.368)
5.Q12m*Quarter=4 -0.008 (0.658) -0.002 (0.692) -0.005 (0.870) -0.017 (0.213)
AUMt−1 0.012** (0.029) 0.009*** (0.000) -0.009 (0.279) -0.010*** (0.001)
LN(No. funds in familyt−1) -0.001 (0.969) 0.014** (0.042) -0.096*** (0.001) -0.020 (0.159)
LN(Total family AUMt−1) -0.017* (0.063) 0.006* (0.051) -0.012 (0.363) -0.013** (0.016)
Constant -1.813*** (0.000) -0.151*** (0.001) -1.518*** (0.000) -0.779*** (0.000)
Observations 31,445 31,447 31,447 31,449
Number of Funds 737 737 737 737
Adjusted R-squared 0.4032 0.2731 0.3658 0.5049
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Table 2.3: Risk-Shifting and Past Performance
This table depicts the result of a panel data regression of log of fund monthly volatility, beta, log of idiosyncratic
volatility and of tracking error volatility on dummies of past performance, quarter dummies, their interactions,
and other control variables. Regressions include the first lag of the dependent variable and time dummies
only for specific crisis periods. Monthly volatility is calculated from daily returns. For each dummy variable,
i.variable = 1 when variable = i. The interaction variables i.variable1 *j.variable2 = 1 when variable1 = i and
variable2 = j. Funds are ranked within their management company by their performance January-to-date in
the first half of the year, and July-to-date in the second half of the year, and divided in terciles of performance
(T (JTD)). Funds are also ranked by style and return relative to all the other funds in the industry over the
same period of time and divided into quintiles (Q(JTD)). Finally, funds are ranked by style and return relative
to all the other funds in the industry for their performance over the past twelve months and also divided into
quintiles (Q(12m)). The latter variable captures the flow-generated incentive whereas the other two reflect the
direct contract-generated incentive.
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
Dependent Var.t−1 0.592*** (0.000) 0.547*** (0.000) 0.604*** (0.000) 0.438*** (0.000)
2.quarter -0.011 (0.479) 0.015*** (0.001) 0.037 (0.173) -0.140*** (0.000)
3.quarter -0.045*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.000) -0.083*** (0.002) -0.170*** (0.000)
4.quarter -0.060*** (0.000) 0.013*** (0.003) -0.063** (0.016) -0.170*** (0.000)
1.T JTD 0.016 (0.124) -0.005 (0.144) 0.044*** (0.010) -0.006 (0.406)
3.T JTD 0.012 (0.222) 0.009*** (0.009) -0.019 (0.243) -0.010 (0.197)
1.T JTD*2.quarter -0.025 (0.176) 0.008** (0.043) -0.056** (0.032) 0.003 (0.798)
1.T JTD*3.quarter 0.028* (0.070) 0.023*** (0.000) -0.028 (0.233) -0.056*** (0.000)
1.T JTD*4.quarter 0.060*** (0.000) 0.017*** (0.000) -0.039 (0.110) -0.040*** (0.001)
3.T JTD*2.quarter 0.013 (0.310) 0.008* (0.053) -0.005 (0.847) -0.015 (0.157)
3.T JTD*3.quarter -0.063*** (0.000) -0.020*** (0.000) 0.040* (0.060) 0.073*** (0.000)
3.T JTD*4.quarter -0.057*** (0.000) -0.013*** (0.003) 0.026 (0.233) 0.068*** (0.000)
1.QJTD -0.012 (0.448) -0.004 (0.442) 0.011 (0.651) 0.014 (0.166)
2.QJTD -0.012 (0.299) -0.003 (0.470) 0.002 (0.908) 0.011 (0.271)
4.QJTD -0.022* (0.094) -0.005 (0.160) -0.017 (0.421) 0.003 (0.801)
5.QJTD -0.034** (0.012) -0.003 (0.542) 0.005 (0.823) 0.013 (0.184)
1.QJTD*2.quarter 0.013 (0.588) -0.005 (0.472) -0.003 (0.923) 0.009 (0.561)
1.QJTD*3.quarter 0.049* (0.086) 0.011 (0.294) 0.047 (0.227) 0.017 (0.265)
1.QJTD*4.quarter 0.045** (0.036) 0.003 (0.700) 0.086** (0.011) 0.037** (0.020)
2.QJTD*2.quarter -0.002 (0.893) -0.004 (0.542) -0.020 (0.501) 0.014 (0.323)
2.QJTD*3.quarter 0.008 (0.692) 0.000 (0.943) -0.005 (0.878) -0.007 (0.627)
2.QJTD*4.quarter 0.011 (0.471) 0.005 (0.382) 0.025 (0.372) 0.003 (0.806)
4.QJTD*2.quarter -0.002 (0.921) 0.004 (0.456) -0.025 (0.393) -0.009 (0.535)
4.QJTD*3.quarter 0.014 (0.453) 0.007 (0.201) 0.006 (0.829) -0.015 (0.298)
4.QJTD*4.quarter 0.013 (0.437) 0.007 (0.131) 0.004 (0.881) 0.003 (0.835)
5.QJTD*2.quarter -0.019 (0.334) -0.013* (0.057) -0.053 (0.113) -0.005 (0.738)
5.QJTD*3.quarter 0.012 (0.565) -0.006 (0.418) 0.001 (0.962) -0.029** (0.034)
5.QJTD*4.quarter 0.030 (0.124) 0.003 (0.679) 0.029 (0.359) -0.005 (0.763)
Observations 31,445 31,447 31,447 31,449
Number of funds 737 737 737 737
Adjusted R-squared 0.4061 0.2775 0.3674 0.5242
Robust standard errors, clustered by fund, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3: Risk-Shifting and past performance (Cont.)
Continuation from the previous page. LN(AUMt−1) is the natural log of total net assets of a fund. LN(No.
funds in familyt−1) in the log of the number of funds each asset management company manages included in
the sample. LN(Total AUM familyt−1) is the total assets under management of the family for the funds in the
sample (excludes fixed income funds).
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
1.Q12m 0.042** (0.017) 0.001 (0.901) 0.011 (0.702) -0.017 (0.114)
2.Q12m 0.019 (0.111) -0.000 (0.965) 0.008 (0.720) -0.014 (0.215)
4.Q12m 0.016 (0.119) -0.003 (0.476) 0.050** (0.011) 0.002 (0.884)
5.Q12m 0.016 (0.256) -0.014*** (0.004) 0.077*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.003)
1.Q12m*2.quarter -0.039 (0.155) 0.011* (0.087) -0.018 (0.637) 0.016 (0.292)
1.Q12m*3.quarter -0.036 (0.112) -0.010 (0.243) 0.037 (0.255) 0.032** (0.027)
1.Q12m*4.quarter -0.034 (0.109) -0.001 (0.848) 0.056* (0.099) 0.026 (0.108)
2.Q12m*2.quarter -0.017 (0.302) 0.004 (0.474) 0.002 (0.930) -0.009 (0.556)
2.Q12m*3.quarter -0.021 (0.236) -0.011* (0.065) 0.039 (0.214) 0.040*** (0.009)
2.Q12m*4.quarter -0.040** (0.012) 0.001 (0.915) -0.004 (0.891) 0.013 (0.381)
4.Q12m*2.quarter -0.024 (0.105) -0.003 (0.619) -0.070*** (0.007) 0.013 (0.368)
4.Q12m*3.quarter -0.035** (0.035) -0.005 (0.361) -0.044 (0.128) 0.003 (0.834)
4.Q12m*4.quarter -0.009 (0.573) 0.001 (0.811) -0.022 (0.421) -0.001 (0.965)
5.Q12m*2.quarter -0.016 (0.313) 0.008 (0.176) -0.060** (0.021) -0.003 (0.834)
5.Q12m*3.quarter -0.029 (0.157) 0.000 (0.980) -0.051 (0.106) -0.015 (0.260)
5.Q12m*4.quarter -0.025 (0.139) 0.006 (0.334) -0.066** (0.016) -0.021 (0.109)
AUMt−1 0.012** (0.041) 0.009*** (0.000) -0.010 (0.255) -0.011*** (0.000)
LN(No. funds in familyt−1) -0.002 (0.913) 0.014** (0.044) -0.096*** (0.001) -0.020 (0.152)
LN(Total family AUMt−1) -0.015* (0.084) 0.006* (0.052) -0.011 (0.393) -0.012** (0.024)
Constant -1.799*** (0.000) -0.160*** (0.001) -1.482*** (0.000) -0.718*** (0.000)
Observations 31,445 31,447 31,447 31,449
Number of funds 737 737 737 737
Adjusted R-squared 0.4061 0.2775 0.3674 0.5242
Robust standard errors, clustered by fund, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Risk-Shifting and Past Performance by Month
This table depicts the result of a panel data regression of log of fund monthly volatility, beta, log of idiosyncratic
volatility and of tracking error volatility on dummies of past performance, month and quarter dummies, their
interactions, and other control variables. Dependent variables are as previously defined.
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
Dependent Variablet−1 0.597*** (0.000) 0.548*** (0.000) 0.608*** (0.000) 0.467*** (0.000)
3.quarter -0.055*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) -0.086*** (0.000) -0.167*** (0.000)
4.month -0.070*** (0.000) 0.022*** (0.000) -0.025 (0.328) -0.214*** (0.000)
5.month 0.092*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.123*** (0.000) -0.046*** (0.000)
6.month -0.116*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.760) -0.133*** (0.000) -0.168*** (0.000)
10.month 0.003 (0.841) 0.010** (0.019) 0.034 (0.178) 0.003 (0.814)
11.month -0.076*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.000) -0.068*** (0.001) -0.245*** (0.000)
12.month -0.113*** (0.000) 0.009* (0.061) -0.132*** (0.000) -0.235*** (0.000)
1.T JTD*3.quarter 0.036*** (0.010) 0.025*** (0.000) -0.008 (0.703) -0.042*** (0.000)
3.T JTD*3.quarter -0.066*** (0.000) -0.021*** (0.000) 0.026 (0.188) 0.059*** (0.000)
1.T JTD 0.013 (0.185) -0.005 (0.105) 0.036** (0.028) -0.011 (0.147)
3.T JTD 0.012 (0.197) 0.010*** (0.006) -0.015 (0.337) -0.006 (0.401)
1.T JTD*4.month -0.015 (0.486) 0.004 (0.442) -0.055* (0.065) 0.011 (0.502)
1.T JTD*5.month -0.036* (0.089) 0.010* (0.100) -0.028 (0.433) 0.028* (0.086)
1.T JTD*6.month -0.013 (0.579) 0.012** (0.032) -0.058 (0.101) -0.005 (0.700)
1.T JTD*10.month 0.040* (0.099) 0.013** (0.020) -0.057* (0.099) -0.033** (0.023)
1.T JTD*11.month 0.098*** (0.000) 0.027*** (0.000) 0.022 (0.484) -0.024 (0.141)
1.T JTD*12.month 0.051*** (0.008) 0.011 (0.102) -0.044 (0.182) -0.035** (0.038)
3.T JTD*4.month -0.027 (0.195) 0.003 (0.607) -0.050 (0.153) -0.016 (0.353)
3.T JTD*5.month 0.021 (0.266) 0.006 (0.379) 0.031 (0.347) -0.014 (0.336)
3.T JTD*6.month 0.038** (0.025) 0.016*** (0.004) -0.020 (0.480) -0.034** (0.032)
3.T JTD*10.month -0.048** (0.017) -0.015*** (0.009) 0.024 (0.455) 0.070*** (0.000)
3.T JTD*11.month -0.055*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.003) 0.045 (0.114) 0.054*** (0.001)
3.T JTD*12.month -0.066*** (0.001) -0.009 (0.147) -0.013 (0.664) 0.056*** (0.000)
1.QJTD 0.019* (0.056) 0.002 (0.589) 0.036** (0.028) 0.018*** (0.008)
5.QJTD -0.019** (0.026) -0.005 (0.139) 0.012 (0.378) -0.000 (0.972)
1.QJTD*4.month -0.006 (0.811) -0.006 (0.401) -0.013 (0.698) -0.008 (0.681)
1.QJTD*5.month -0.017 (0.505) -0.003 (0.719) -0.062 (0.149) -0.014 (0.421)
1.QJTD*6.month 0.011 (0.715) -0.013* (0.073) 0.052 (0.180) -0.005 (0.796)
1.QJTD*10.month 0.026 (0.367) -0.014 (0.112) 0.084** (0.048) 0.010 (0.537)
1.QJTD*11.month 0.025 (0.387) -0.008 (0.526) 0.035 (0.342) 0.034* (0.087)
1.QJTD*12.month -0.017 (0.617) 0.011 (0.314) 0.023 (0.607) 0.015 (0.416)
5.QJTD*4.month 0.035* (0.083) -0.010 (0.114) 0.021 (0.502) 0.037** (0.029)
5.QJTD*5.month -0.058*** (0.003) -0.015* (0.066) -0.083*** (0.010) -0.010 (0.567)
5.QJTD*6.month -0.034 (0.152) -0.003 (0.688) -0.062* (0.068) 0.006 (0.769)
5.QJTD*10.month 0.029 (0.180) 0.011* (0.092) 0.059* (0.063) -0.003 (0.848)
5.QJTD*11.month 0.034 (0.112) 0.003 (0.641) 0.003 (0.929) 0.004 (0.786)
5.QJTD*12.month 0.002 (0.916) -0.006 (0.429) 0.009 (0.780) 0.011 (0.503)
Robust standard errors, clustered by fund, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
75
Table 2.4: Risk-Shifting and Past Performance by Month (Cont.)
Total Idiosync. Tracking
VARIABLES Volatility p-value Beta p-value Volatility p-value Error p-value
1.Q12m 0.022 (0.144) -0.000 (0.916) 0.009 (0.710) -0.004 (0.527)
5.Q12m -0.002 (0.853) -0.011*** (0.000) 0.032*** (0.008) 0.015*** (0.009)
1.Q12m*4.month 0.019 (0.580) 0.017** (0.016) 0.039 (0.366) 0.030 (0.125)
1.Q12m*5.month -0.019 (0.464) 0.006 (0.454) -0.011 (0.823) 0.007 (0.667)
1.Q12m*6.month -0.048 (0.187) 0.014* (0.057) -0.057 (0.193) -0.010 (0.564)
1.Q12m*10.month 0.001 (0.980) -0.007 (0.424) 0.081** (0.044) 0.004 (0.839)
1.Q12m*11.month -0.032 (0.274) 0.005 (0.548) 0.030 (0.475) 0.022 (0.222)
1.Q12m*12.month 0.010 (0.729) 0.001 (0.952) 0.046 (0.305) 0.025 (0.180)
5.Q12m*4.month 0.001 (0.967) -0.001 (0.933) -0.019 (0.462) -0.017 (0.247)
5.Q12m*5.month 0.004 (0.843) 0.014** (0.037) -0.035 (0.207) 0.021 (0.126)
5.Q12m*6.month 0.002 (0.924) 0.005 (0.488) 0.015 (0.659) 0.007 (0.638)
5.Q12m*10.month -0.006 (0.772) 0.014** (0.047) -0.037 (0.193) -0.001 (0.966)
5.Q12m*11.month -0.013 (0.537) -0.009 (0.310) -0.029 (0.322) -0.011 (0.497)
5.Q12m*12.month -0.001 (0.948) 0.005 (0.487) -0.047 (0.162) -0.021 (0.128)
AUMt−1 0.011** (0.039) 0.009*** (0.000) -0.009 (0.266) -0.011*** (0.001)
LN(No. funds in familyt−1) -0.001 (0.938) 0.015** (0.038) -0.095*** (0.001) -0.021 (0.126)
LN(Total family AUMt−1) -0.013 (0.136) 0.006** (0.047) -0.008 (0.536) -0.010* (0.067)
Constant -1.818*** (0.000) -0.166*** (0.000) -1.523*** (0.000) -0.730*** (0.000)
Observations 31,445 31,447 31,447 31,449
Number of Funds 737 737 737 737
Adjusted R-squared 0.4159 0.2799 0.3751 0.5476
Robust standard errors, clustered by fund, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Risk-Shifting and Portfolio Holdings
This table depicts the result of a panel data regression of risk shifting measure,
RSf,t, on dummies of past performance, quarter dummies, their interactions, and
other control variables as previously described
VARIABLES RSf,t Long Position p-value RSf,t p-value
Dependent Variablet−1 0.486*** (0.000) 0.363*** (0.000)
Quarter=2 or 4 0.000 (0.315) 0.000 (0.570)
Quarter=4 -0.002*** (0.002) -0.002*** (0.005)
1.T JTD -0.000 (0.808) 0.000 (0.672)
3.T JTD 0.001* (0.091) 0.000 (0.357)
1.T JTD*Quarter=2 or 4 0.000 (0.369) -0.000 (0.986)
3.T JTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.001** (0.021) -0.001 (0.251)
1.T JTD*Quarter=4 -0.001 (0.336) -0.000 (0.548)
3.T JTD*Quarter=4 0.002*** (0.006) 0.002*** (0.009)
1.QJTD 0.001* (0.069) 0.000 (0.508)
2.QJTD 0.000 (0.266) 0.000 (0.593)
4.QJTD 0.000 (0.236) 0.001 (0.154)
5.QJTD 0.001 (0.112) 0.001 (0.109)
1.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.001 (0.220) -0.001 (0.429)
2.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.001 (0.133) -0.001 (0.202)
4.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 -0.001* (0.086) -0.001* (0.070)
5.QJTD*Quarter=2 or 4 0.000 (0.686) 0.000 (0.894)
1.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.002* (0.074) 0.001 (0.154)
2.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.001* (0.065) 0.001* (0.096)
4.QJTD*Quarter=4 0.001* (0.089) 0.002** (0.044)
5.QJTD*Quarter=4 -0.001 (0.340) -0.001 (0.320)
AUMt−1 -0.000 (0.627) -0.000 (0.508)
LN(No. funds in familyt−1) -0.002*** (0.005) -0.004** (0.044)
LN(Total family AUMt−1) 0.000 (0.876) 0.001 (0.319)
Constant 0.006 (0.270) 0.001 (0.862)
Observations 10,112 10,114
Number of Funds 387 387
Adjusted R-squared 0.4216 0.2723
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Table 2.5: Risk-Shifting and Portfolio Holdings (Cont.)
Continuation from the previous page. LN(AUMt−1) is the natural log of total net
assets of a fund. LN(No. funds in familyt−1) in the log of the number of funds
each asset management company manages included in the sample. LN(Total AUM
familyt−1) is the total assets under management of the family for the funds in the
sample (excludes fixed income funds).
VARIABLES σHf,t Long Position p-value σ
H
f,t p-value
1.Q12m -0.001 (0.157) -0.001 (0.344)
2.Q12m -0.000 (0.379) -0.000 (0.321)
4.Q12m -0.000 (0.650) -0.000 (0.348)
5.Q12m -0.000 (0.354) -0.000 (0.615)
1.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 0.001 (0.103) 0.001 (0.136)
2.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 0.001** (0.020) 0.001** (0.021)
4.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 0.000 (0.990) 0.000 (0.516)
5.Q12m*Quarter=2 or 4 0.001 (0.113) 0.001* (0.089)
1.Q12m*Quarter=4 -0.001 (0.537) -0.001 (0.258)
2.Q12m*Quarter=4 -0.000 (0.491) -0.000 (0.454)
4.Q12m*Quarter=4 0.001 (0.178) 0.000 (0.772)
5.Q12m*Quarter=4 -0.001 (0.395) -0.001 (0.406)
Observations 10,112 10,114
Number of Funds 387 387
Adjusted R-squared 0.4216 0.2723
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Figure 2.1: Monthly Variation in Total Volatility
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Figure 2.2: Monthly Variation in Beta by Month
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Figure 2.3: Monthly Variation in Idiosyncratic Volatility
-0,2
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
first tercile third tercile
(a) JTD company ranking
-0,2
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
first quintile (JTD) fifth quintile (JTD)
(b) JTD industry ranking
-0,2
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
first quintile (12m) fifth quintile (12m)
(c) 12-month industry ranking
81
Figure 2.4: Monthly Variation in Tracking Error
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Short Positions on
Fund Performance
Co-authored with Pedro A. Saffi
Introduction
The analysis of the performance of investment funds and the ability of fund managers
to generate value to investors are two of the most researched topics in Finance (see
Ferson (2010) for an excellent review). Starting with the seminal paper by Grinblatt
and Titman (1989), a large literature on portfolio holdings has developed, looking at
their characteristics and their consequences on performance.
The majority of papers uses holdings information reported by mutual funds to
the SEC (e.g. the Thompson-Reuters). These data only include long positions held
by funds but lack information on the short positions. While this is likely not to be
problematic for the analysis of equity mutual funds, it imposes an obvious constraint
to the analysis of hedge fund performance. These funds use short selling as a key
component of their trading strategies, often starting and exiting trades that are offset
by long positions.
We use a unique dataset of Brazilian hedge funds holdings to examine the im-
pact of long and short positions on performance. In particular, we test if changes in
long/short positions and their risk can forecast future performance. While we find
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that funds with large increases in the risk of long-only positions risk relative to the
previous 24 months underperform by about 3% per year on average, those that in-
crease the risk of short-only positions overperform their peers by about 1% a year on
average, net of fees. Neither monthly changes of long nor short positions can forecast
next month’s abnormal returns.
The Brazilian asset management industry is the sixth largest in the world, with
assets under management around $1.1 trillion USD (larger than the UK’s) and with
the average fund managing $74.6 million USD.1 The regulators requires that all regis-
tered funds disclose their investment positions every month, regardless of the direction
of the position (i.e. long or short) or the asset class (e.g. equity, bonds, cash and
derivatives), in effect providing a monthly snapshot of a fund’s balance sheet. Regu-
lators also ask that funds report, for each security, the total amount bought and sold
within a particular month.
Using data from an emerging market like Brazil always comes with questions on
the reliability of the data and the extension of any results to more developed markets
like those found in the United States. The main disadvantages of our dataset relative
to the ones used in the United States are the shorter time period (our data goes
from January 2006 to June 2009) and the smaller size of Brazilian securities and
funds, which restricts the calculation of abnormal return measures. However, we are
confident the advantages of our data more than compensate for these drawbacks,
enabling us to investigate the role played by short positions on portfolio performance
unlike any other previous article in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1 places our work in the context of the
existing literature on short sales and ownership structure. Section 3.2 describes the
Brazilian investment funds’ data. Section 3.3 presents our results. Finally, Section
1For a more detailed description of the Brazilian fund industry see Varga and Wengert (2009)
and Bertol-Domingues (2011).
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3.4 concludes.
3.1 Literature Review
Portfolio holdings are first used in the paper by Grinblatt and Titman (1989), who use
portfolio holdings to analyze managerial skill. Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Wer-
mers (1997) find that managers have stock picking abilities, particularly for growth
funds. Wermers (2000) find that, on average, US mutual funds hold stocks that beat
the CRSP value-weighted index by 1.3% a year before fees but underperform the
market net of fees. All these papers look at the characteristics of the stocks in a
fund’s portfolio, analyzing, in particular, the ones held by skilled managers.
There are also other advantages in using holdings-based measures. As Jiang, Yao
and Yu (2007) point out, these measures are a weighted average of a large number
of stock prices, which provide a more accurate measure and with better statistical
power even when fund holdings are observed less frequently than fund returns.
Another strand looks at how how managers might change risk levels due to agency
issues. Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Busse (2001) analyze how
a convex payoff function given by the flow-performance relationship may induce fund
managers to take excess risk towards the end of the year. Palomino and Prat (2003)
show under which conditions a risk neutral manager takes excess risk. Basak et al.
(2007) show how a risk-averse manager behaves given an implicit incentive to outper-
form a benchmark.
Investors are not necessarily hurt by increasing risk levels. Managers with superior
skill may select stocks with higher risk or actively choose to increase risk to time the
market. Ultimately, the impact of risk shifting on performance is an empirical one.
Huang et al. (2011) are the first to look at the issue. They measure the future
performance of funds that actively manipulate their level of risk and find that these
funds tend to significantly underperform those that do not. They propose a holdings-
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based measure of risk-shifting, using only long positions, that controls for exogenous
changes in the market conditions and allows one to capture the change in intended
volatility without bias generated by subsequent trading or exogenous shocks. The
underperformance comes mainly from funds that increase idiosyncratic risk and those
that concentrate holdings on a few positions.
There is an extensive literature that looks at how aggregate measures of short
selling affect stock returns (e.g. Jones and Lamont (2002), Asquith, Pathak and
Ritter (2004), Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007), and Nagel (2005)). The main
finding is that stocks with abnormally high levels of short sales have lower abnormal
returns in the future. However, there is no paper with an extensive analysis of the
short positions held by funds and what securities are actually shorted by managers
and which characteristics they have.
3.2 Data Description
3.2.1 Risk-Shifting Measures
Funds can actively change the level of risk of their portfolio by either changing their
load on systematic risk or by changing the level of diversification of their portfolio.
In order to capture the risk-shifting behaviour of funds, we employ the methodology
proposed by Huang et al. (2011) and compare a fund’s past realized volatility, σRi,t,
with the volatility implied by the fund’s most recent disclosed positions, σHi,t:
RSi,t = σ
H
i,t − σRi,t (3.1)
The realized volatility, σRi,t, is a backward-looking measure of the total risk of the
fund and is calculated from daily fund returns over the previous 24 months.2 The
volatility calculated from the most recent portfolio holdings, σHi,t, is, on the other
2Huang et al. (2011) use the past 36 months to evaluate the intended risk level of the fund. Our
data spans a shorter period of time and doesn’t allow us to use such a long period.
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hand, a forward-looking measure that captures the intended volatility of the fund. It
can be computed as the sample standard deviation of the return of a hypothetical
portfolio that has held the most recently disclosed fund positions over the previous
24 months. This measure can alternatively be calculated as the square root of the
variance of a fund with portfolio weights given by the fund’s holdings positions, ωi,t
and the realized variance-covariance matrix of the assets returns, Σt:
σHi,t =
√
V ar(ω′i,tRt) =
√
ω′i,tV ar(Rt)ωi,t =
√
ω′i,tΣtωi,t (3.2)
The key aspect of this methodology is that, as it uses overlapping time periods, it
only measures active risk-shifting. For instance, if a fund doesn’t change its portfolio
composition over time but the risk of the assets has changed, the risk-shifting measure
will be zero. RSi,t will, hence, be unaffected by changes in market condition. Huang
et al. (2011) also notice that this measure can potentially capture the impact of
unobserved actions as window dressing or interim trades. Although other measures
of risk-shifting are analyzed, these issues are not as problematic for us as our sample
has monthly instead of quarterly portfolio holdings.
With the portfolio weights and the variance-covariance matrix of assets returns,
we can then calculate the risk-shifting measure as per equations 3.1 and 3.2 every
month. We perform these calculations for the whole fund (using all securities with
return data available in the previous 24 months), only for long positions, and only
for the short positions of a fund.
3.2.2 Excess Returns
We employ several measures of returns in an attempt to control for exposure to
systematic factors. Many funds use the CDI as their benchmark, so the first measure
of excess returns is the difference between the fund return and the risk free rate
Ri − Rf . The second measure, Ri − RCAPM , uses daily return data and is based
on the CAPM model with betas estimated from all daily returns within a month.
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The third measure, Ri−RHoldingsCAPM , uses betas computed for each security held by the
fund based on their previous 24 months of returns and then value-weighted to obtain
the holdings-based portfolio beta. This measure allows for dynamic risk adjustments
since betas change every month according to the securities held by a fund.
Our fourth measure is a characteristics-adjusted return computed by matching a
fund to others with similar AUM and returns in the previous month. First, we rank
all funds by lagged AUM and divide them in terciles. Then, within each tercile, we
rank funds by lagged returns and further split then in terciles, creating 3x3 portfolios.
Each fund is matched to one of these nine portfolios and we define Ri−RCharac. as the
difference between the fund’s return and its corresponding matched-portfolios average
return.
3.2.3 Sample Selection
We use a database of Brazilian funds provided by Quantum, a Brazilian consulting
company, that comprises monthly portfolio holdings for both mutual and hedge funds.
This database is extremely detailed and has many features that enables a richer anal-
ysis of portfolio holdings. The data are collected from mandatory reports sent to the
CVM (the Brazilian SEC) and directly by Quantum from asset management compa-
nies. It includes daily information on returns, assets under management, inflows and
outflows, and the number of shareholders. It has monthly observations of complete
portfolio holdings, i.e., long and short positions on several asset classes, including
equity as well as bonds, derivatives and any other assets the fund might invest in.
Quantum also provides qualitative information on the fund as style, fees structure,
type of client and restrictions.
The holdings data is sampled at a higher frequency (monthly instead of quarterly)
which, as pointed out by Elton et al. (2010), can have a significant impact on the
results. As quarterly data misses the intra-quarter trades, adding more information
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can change or even reverse previous findings. Furthermore, since 2008 Brazilian funds
are required to report not only the net position at the end of each month but also
how much they bought and sold of each security within that month. Although we do
not have access to the exact timing of trades within a month, it still allows a more
precise measure of turnover and indicates how active funds are. Often, the lack of
data only allows researchers to estimate turnover from net positions at the end of the
period. This can be misleading if a fund is very active but keeps similar net positions
at the end of each evaluation period.
Under CVM regulations, all funds are required to disclose similar information and
there is no legal difference between a hedge fund and a mutual fund as all funds fall
under the same regulatory framework. Rather than being divided in two distinct fund
types as in the US, Brazilian funds differentiate themselves mainly by (1) the type of
assets they are allowed to trade, (2) the maximum percentage they can hold of each
type of asset, (3) the type of client they cater to, and (4) whether they engage in
short-selling. Funds also decide on the fees structure and on the flow restriction they
can impose on clients. The CVM imposes few restrictions on the funds ex-ante, being
up to the fund manager to decide what specific type of fund she will run. All these
decision are binding and occur before a fund’s inception date. Any posterior change
has to be approved by the shareholders and the CVM. The main advantage of this
unified regulatory framework is that it allows any empirical study to control for the
impact of each specific characteristic. In particular, conclusions drawn from studies
based on US mutual (hedge) funds cannot be applied to hedge (mutual) funds because
these two types of funds differ in too many levels. The database employed in this
paper controls for each different characteristic and, as a consequence, the conclusions
are more general.
We focus our analysis on actively managed domestic funds, following the classifica-
tion determined by ANBIMA, the industry’s self-regulatory body. They comprise of
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equity and multi-market funds, excluding balanced, bond, international, index funds
and funds-of-funds. Multi-market funds can trade in any market with no restriction
on holdings whereas equity funds are required to invest at least 67% of their assets in
equity. We also excluded funds that manage less than $5 million and funds that have
less than four shareholders for over 50% of the sample period.3 These restrictions
leaves us with around 700 funds. From these funds, we will concentrate on a subsam-
ple that engage in short-selling, leaving us with 427 funds and 7,689 valid fund-month
observations. The number of funds with short-selling positions ranges from 67 in Jan-
uary 2007 to 305 in June 2009. Public data on portfolio holdings positions becomes
available from 2006.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the funds’ total net assets under manage-
ment (AUM), age, net-of-fees investor monthly returns and holdings returns. It also
includes a description of the portfolio composition, the intended volatility, the real-
ized volatility and the risk-shifting index. The average AUMt is USD$116.2 million
with a standard deviation of USD$287.1 million. The average age is 4 years with a
standard deviation of 3.9 years. The investor return equals to 0.84% per month on
average with a 4.75% volatility. Flows are defined as the total net inflow over total
net assets in the previous period and are calculated as:
Flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 + ri,t)
AUMt−1
(3.3)
where ri,t if the return of fund f in period t. The funds in our sample have a
percentage net flow of 3% with a standard deviation of 24%.
In order to calculate the risk-shifting measure we need to evaluate, for each port-
folio holding observation, the volatility of this position in the previous 24 months
(holding’s realized volatility). Each holding position will gives us portfolio weights
that need to be matched to a variance-covariance matrix of past returns (see equation
3Funds that are not exclusive to one single client need to have at least three shareholders.
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3.2). For equity, we collect returns from Datastream and only include firms stocks
at least 24 months of previous data. For cash and fixed-income holdings we use the
Brazilian interbank lending rate, the CDI, as a proxy for returns. Derivatives posi-
tions are, however, more problematic and have been excluded from our calculations.
Although we know the underlying asset of a derivative position, these instruments
are often short-lived and more difficult to price. Our measures of risk-shifting are
hence only based on equity and fixed-income holdings. Every month, we match an
average of 76.2% of AUM with an standard deviation of 20.8%; (matched) equities
are, on average, 22.4% of AUM and (matched) cash or fixed income assets respond
for 53.7% of assets. Although the latter might seem high, it possibly only reflects
the fact that many funds that engage in short-selling have a long-short self-financing
strategy which leaves them with a considerable proportion of their assets available
to invest on the risk-free asset. Long positions (all asset classes as defined in Huang
et al. (2011)) comprise 84.1% of matched assets and equity short positions are 7.5%.
In Figure 3.1, we plot the percentage of assets under management invested in short
positions (top panel), the average number of shorted stocks and the total number of
stocks held by a fund (bottom panel) for all funds in the sample. We can see a large
increase in shorting from around March 2007 until July 2008, going from around 10%
to 25% of AUM. While the average total number of stocks invested by a fund is
generally stable around 25 stocks, the number of stocks held short follow the pattern
seen for AUM. In March 2007, the number of shorted stocks held by funds increased
from 2 and reached almost 10 stocks in July 2007.
The previous figures included all funds in the sample. If we constrain the sample
to only include funds that have engaged in short-selling, we observe that they hold
27 different stocks on average with a standard deviation of 19 stocks. Funds short
an average of 9 stocks with a standard deviation of over 11 stocks. They also have
relatively low levels of systemic risk, with an average β of 0.25. This happens because
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many funds have significant investments in bonds or follow long/short strategies with
low exposure to market risk. The equity positions, however, have a much higher β,
around 0.8. All βs are calculated using a single factor model from weekly returns
over a two-year window.
In Figure 3.2, the top panel displays the holdings-based volatility and the realized
volatility for long-only positions while the lower panel shows the difference between
these two variables. Similar to results found by Huang et al. (2011) for US mutual
funds, there is a sharp reduction in risk in September 2008, the month that Lehman
Brother’s went bankrupt and the financial crisis reached its peak. In Figure 3.3, we
observe a similar pattern for short-only positions. There is an increase in risk in
early 2007 followed by a large decrease in the months around October 2008. This is
evidence of a withdraw from all types of risky positions, both long and short ones,
given the uncertainties brought by the financial crisis.
3.3 Empirical Results
Our multivariate tests look at how the returns of fund i in month t + 1 are affected
by changes in characteristics of its long and short positions at time t. Our baseline
specification is:
Ri,t+1 = α + β
′ ∗∆(Positions)i,t + θ′ ∗Risk Shiftingi,t + γ′ ? Controlsi,t + i,t+1(3.4)
where Ri,t+1 is one of our return measures at t+1. ∆(Positions)i,t denote the change
from t−1 to t of holdings classified according to investment type. We include positions
held in long-only and short-only equity, derivatives, and in fixed income securities.
These variables are meant to capture whether fund managers can successfully select
securities that yield higher returns in the following month.
We also use four variables that capture risk-shifting. We compute the risk shifting
measure shown in Equation 3.1 for long-only (RS Long) and short-only positions (RS
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Short). Given the asymmetric impact of risk shifting measures found by Huang et al.
(2011), we divide each risk shifting measure in terms of whether they are positive or
negative.
We use several controls to make sure that our results are not driven by spurious
correlation with previous factors used in the literature. We include the the six-month
realized return volatility, fund age, AUM, fund-family AUM, previous month’s return,
and fund flow.
Our main results are presented in Table 3.2. We don’t find any explanatory power
for changes in holdings regardless of the excess return measures we use. In Columns
(2) and (5) we find that funds that shift the risk of their long-only position, either
decreasing or increasing it relative to its realized risk in the previous 24 months, tend
to underperform in the next month by a large amount. For instance, the annual-
ized underperformance for funds that increase their long-only risk by one standard
deviation (1.39%) is equal to about 4.2% using CAPM-adjusted excess returns. Un-
like Huang et al. (2011), we also find evidence that funds that decrease their risk
also underperform by a similar amount. These results are in line with the reasoning
that managers do not possess stock selection or market timing skills, instead having
inferior ability or reacting to contractual incentives.
When we examine the impact of short-only positions in columns (3) and (6) we
find the opposite effect. Funds that increase their short-only risk by one standard
deviation actually outperform their peers by around 3.5% a year. We do not find
evidence that decreases of short-only risk affect future performance. Managers who
choose to increase the risk of their short-only positions seem to correctly time the
market, yielding better returns in the following month.
In Table 3.3 we repeat these tests for two alternative measures of excess returns.
In Columns (1) to (3) we use CAPM excess returns as our dependent variable. Each
month we estimate betas of individual holdings using 24 months of past returns rela-
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tive to the Brazilian stock market index, which are then aggregated using the fraction
of each security in our matched holdings data to compute the portfolio holdings beta.
In Columns (4) to (6) we compute fund characteristics-matched excess returns, as-
signing each fund to one of 3x3 portfolios sorted on lagged AUM and returns. Under
both measures, our main result with the overperformance of increases in short-only
risk remain significant.
In Table 3.4 we investigate the long-term performance of the results by looking
at predictability of returns using explanatory variables measured up to four months
before. Long-only results persist up to four months for funds that increase their
risk, but not for those reducing the risk of their long positions not being statistically
significant for variables measured more than two months before. When we examine
short-only positions the results are much less persistent.
3.4 Conclusion
There are several advantages in using portfolio holdings data to analyze fund perfor-
mance. Unfortunately, most funds database only report long-only positions and are
disclosed, at most, on a quarterly basis. Moreover, hedge funds, that make exten-
sive use of short selling and financial instruments, are not required to report their
holdings and, in general, studies on these funds need to rely on, biased, self-reporting
databases.
We use a unique data set of Brazilian hedge funds holdings to test whether changes
in long or short positions can forecast future returns. The Brazilian asset management
industry os the sixth largest in the world and all registered funds are required to
disclosed complete holdings positions on a monthly basis.
Our main results indicate that funds with large increases in the risk of long-only
positions underperform their peers by about 3% per year on average. Funds that
increase the risk of short-only positions overperform their peers by about 1% on
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average. These results are robust for several measure of performance.
Results for the long positions are in line with previous findings in the literature
and are consistent with changes in risk due to agency problems. Funds that actively
change the risk of their short positions seem to correctly time the market, yielding
better returns. Although the results are promising, the sample period the data covers
is still short. Our next step will be to expand the data and further test for changes
in portfolio composition.
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Figure 3.1: Short Positions of Investment Funds - 2006 to 2009
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Figure 3.2: Risk Shifting of Long Positions
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Figure 3.3: Risk Shifting of Short Positions
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Number of Standard
Variable Observations Mean Median Deviation
Assets under Management 21,279 74,611 18,500 231,937
Age (Years) 21,946 4.86 2.71 5.63
Returns 20,968 0.59% 1.08% 6.95%
Flow 21,572 4.26% 0.00% 22.71%
Matched (% AUM) 24,484 77.20% 80.78% 20.42%
Equity(% AUM) 24,484 48.39% 57.55% 36.01%
Long (% AUM) 24,484 80.22% 82.74% 22.09%
Short (% AUM) 24,484 2.80% 0.00% 7.50%
CDI (% AUM) 24,484 28.62% 4.45% 34.72%
No. Stocks 24,484 19.10 15.00 15.57
No. Stocks Short 24,484 2.40 0.00 6.77
βFund 24,482 0.52 0.62 0.39
βEquity 24,392 0.83 0.87 0.27
βLong 24,481 0.54 0.62 0.36
βShort 24,484 0.24 0.00 0.41
StDev Realized (σHf,t)) 24,482 17.96% 19.64% 13.19%
StDev Realized Equity 24,392 37.88% 27.78% 45.33%
StDev Realized Long 24,481 17.97% 19.55% 12.91%
StDev Realized Short 24,484 7.40% 0.00% 13.29%
Risk Shifting (RS) 24,482 -0.43% -0.36% 5.34%
RS Equity 24,392 -2.17% 1.17% 66.62%
RS Long 24,481 -0.42% -0.40% 4.84%
RS Short 24,465 -4.77% 0.00% 12.86%
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)
This table shows descriptive statistics for the funds that have engaged in short
selling at least once between January 2006 and June 2009.
Number of Standard
Variable Observations Mean Median Deviation
Assets under Management 5,433 120,869 38,506 301,524
Age (Years) 5,648 3.52 2.17 3.54
Returns 5,393 1.07% 1.05% 3.68%
Flow 5,591 3.06% -0.20% 24.11%
Matched (% AUM) 6,412 75.34% 78.24% 21.49%
Equity(% AUM) 6,412 17.13% 7.13% 23.86%
Long (% AUM) 6,412 86.51% 87.61% 25.49%
Short (% AUM) 6,412 10.70% 5.93% 11.42%
CDI (% AUM) 6,412 58.00% 63.38% 30.18%
No. Stocks 6,412 27.22 23.00 18.98
No. Stocks Short 6,412 9.17 5.00 10.62
βFund 6,412 0.19 0.07 0.29
βEquity 6,399 0.81 0.87 0.42
βLong 6,411 0.27 0.19 0.27
βShort 6,412 0.93 0.94 0.15
StDev Realized (σHf,t)) 6,412 8.73% 4.57% 10.48%
StDev Realized Equity 6,399 62.33% 33.92% 80.41%
StDev Realized Long 6,411 8.84% 5.50% 9.44%
StDev Realized Short 6,412 28.25% 26.43% 9.23%
Risk Shifting (RS) 6,412 -2.05% -2.00% 5.91%
RS Equity 6,399 -6.74% 1.52% 118.89%
RS Long 6,411 -2.18% -2.14% 4.46%
RS Short 6,393 2.21% 1.33% 6.77%
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Table 3.2: Fund Performance and the Impact of Short Positions
The table displays regressions of fund returns at time t + 1 on fund characteristics measured at time t. The sample
period ranges from January 2006 to June 2009 and uses Brazilian investment funds that have used short selling as part
of their investment strategy at least once during this period. The dependent variables are: Ri −Rf , which denotes a
fund’s monthly return less the Brazilian interbank loan rate (the CDI), and Ri −RCAPM , which is the fund’s excess
return relative to a market model using the Brazilian stock market index. The explanatory variables are all lagged
one month and are given by: ∆(% Z) is the monthly change of a particular type of positions, where Z corresponds,
respectively to, Long-only, Short-only, Derivatives, and Fixed Income. RS Long and RS Short denote the difference
in holdings-volatility and realized-volatility of Long and Short positions. Volatility 6m is the standard deviation of
returns in the previous 6 months, Age is fund age since inception, AUM is asset under management, Family AUM is
the total AUM of the fund’s family, lagged return is the fund’s return in the previous month, and Flow is the total
monthly net inflow scaled by total net assets in the previous period. All regressions have standard errors clustered at
the fund level that are reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***=statistical significance
at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% percent level, *=significant at the 10% level.
Variable Ri −Rf Ri −RCAPM
∆(% Long) -0.166 0.175 0.185 0.583 0.763 0.782
[0.562] [0.571] [0.571] [0.595] [0.603] [0.611]
∆(% Short) 0.093 -0.027 0.036 -0.259 -0.358 -0.331
[0.670] [0.676] [0.684] [0.699] [0.688] [0.702]
∆(% Derivatives) -0.575 -0.297 -0.457 -0.009 0.2 0.18
[1.260] [1.285] [1.280] [0.981] [1.007] [1.010]
∆(% Fixed Income) -0.165 -0.545 -0.534 -0.113 -0.388 -0.377
[0.402] [0.405] [0.401] [0.397] [0.394] [0.391]
Max(0,RS Long) -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.272** -0.251**
[0.146] [0.132] [0.132] [0.120]
Min(0, RS Long) -0.305*** -0.298*** -0.188*** -0.190***
[0.084] [0.084] [0.057] [0.056]
Max(0,RS Short) 0.172*** 0.079***
[0.040] [0.027]
Min(0, RS Short) 0.002 -0.004
[0.017] [0.013]
Volatility 6m 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.001 0.005 0.006
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Age -0.11 -0.068 -0.07 -0.123 -0.072 -0.077
[0.081] [0.073] [0.076] [0.088] [0.080] [0.081]
AUM 0.04 0.048 0.051 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009
[0.042] [0.040] [0.041] [0.043] [0.039] [0.040]
Family AUM -0.080*** -0.058** -0.068** -0.028 -0.018 -0.02
[0.029] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.025] [0.027]
Lagged Return 0.342*** 0.347*** 0.344*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.064***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Flow (%) -0.448* -0.468* -0.478* 0.135 0.106 0.096
[0.234] [0.245] [0.250] [0.170] [0.171] [0.171]
Constant 0.423 -0.219 -0.216 0.544** 0.186 0.146
[0.298] [0.296] [0.305] [0.275] [0.283] [0.293]
Obs. 6,656 6,655 6,640 4,276 4,275 4,263
Adj. R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.03
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Table 3.3: Fund Performance and the Impact of Short Positions:
Alternative Abnormal Return Measures
The table displays regressions of fund returns at time t + 1 on characteristics measured at time t. The sample period
ranges from January 2006 to June 2009 and uses Brazilian investment funds that have used short selling as part of
their investment strategy at least once during this period. The dependent variables are: Ri−RHoldingsCAPM , which denotes
a fund’s monthly return less the expected return from the CAPM model based on the portfolio derived from individual
holdings, and Ri −RCharac., which is the fund’s excess return relative to the average return of a characteristic-based
benchmark portfolio matched on lagged AUM and lagged returns. The matching portfolios are created by splitting
funds in terciles based on lagged AUM and further sorted on lagged returns. The explanatory variables are all lagged
one month and are given by: ∆(% Z) is the monthly change of a particular type of positions, where Z corresponds,
respectively to, Long-only, Short-only, Derivatives, and Fixed Income. RS Long and RS Short denote the difference
in holdings-volatility and realized-volatility of Long and Short positions. Volatility 6m is the standard deviation of
returns in the previous 6 months, Age is fund age since inception, AUM are assets under management, Family AUM
is a fund’s family AUM, lagged return is the return in the previous month, and Flow is the total monthly net inflow
scaled by total net assets in the previous period. All regressions have standard errors clustered at the fund level
that are reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***=statistical significance at the 1% level,
**=significant at the 5% percent level, *=significant at the 10% level.
Variable Ri −RHoldingsCAPM Ri −RCharac.
∆(% Long) -0.37 -0.197 -0.197 -0.421 -0.353 -0.357
[0.484] [0.485] [0.487] [0.489] [0.492] [0.494]
∆(% Short) -0.576 -0.629 -0.614 0.098 0.079 0.085
[0.553] [0.549] [0.555] [0.618] [0.618] [0.620]
∆(% Derivatives) -0.9 -0.731 -0.809 -0.367 -0.27 -0.326
[1.076] [1.083] [1.083] [1.090] [1.110] [1.111]
∆(% Fixed Income) -0.464 -0.703** -0.696** -0.411 -0.552* -0.548*
[0.327] [0.316] [0.315] [0.323] [0.318] [0.318]
Max(0,RS Long) -0.297*** -0.279*** -0.248** -0.243**
[0.111] [0.100] [0.111] [0.104]
Min(0, RS Long) -0.139* -0.139* -0.032 -0.029
[0.072] [0.072] [0.057] [0.056]
Max(0,RS Short) 0.046* 0.055**
[0.025] [0.027]
Min(0, RS Short) 0.001 0.014
[0.014] [0.012]
Volatility 6m 0.004 0.008* 0.008* 0.002 0.005 0.006*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Age -0.094 -0.07 -0.068 -0.137** -0.123** -0.114*
[0.075] [0.069] [0.070] [0.064] [0.061] [0.062]
AUM -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 0.058* 0.053* 0.053*
[0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.032] [0.031] [0.032]
Family AUM -0.024 -0.014 -0.016 -0.021 -0.02 -0.026
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Lagged Return 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.071***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Flow (%) -0.601*** -0.614*** -0.614*** -0.680*** -0.685*** -0.675***
[0.222] [0.228] [0.229] [0.194] [0.195] [0.197]
Constant 0.447* 0.175 0.167 0.123 0.089 0.159
[0.255] [0.246] [0.253] [0.258] [0.273] [0.277]
Obs. 6,656 6,655 6,640 6,656 6,655 6,64
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
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Table 3.4: Fund Performance and Short Holdings Positions: Long-Term
Performance
The table displays regressions of monthly fund returns on characteristics measured at different lags. The sample period
ranges from January 2006 to June 2009 and uses Brazilian investment funds that have used short selling as part of
their investment strategy at least once during this period. Two Months, Three Months and Four months denote,
respectively, explanatory variables lagged two, three, and four months. The dependent variables are: Ri −Rf , which
denotes a fund’s monthly return less the Brazilian interbank loan rate (the CDI), and Ri − RCAPM , which is the
fund’s excess return relative to a market model using the Brazilian stock market index. The explanatory variables
are all lagged one month and are given by: ∆(% Z) is the monthly change of a particular type of positions, where Z
corresponds, respectively to, Long-only, Short-only, Derivatives, and Fixed Income. RS Long and RS Short denote
the difference in holdings-volatility and realized-volatility of Long and Short positions. Volatility 6m is the standard
deviation of returns in the previous 6 months, Age is fund age since inception, AUM is asset under management,
Family AUM is the total AUM of the fund’s family, lagged return is the fund’s return in the previous month, and Flow
is the total monthly net inflow scaled by total net assets in the previous period. All regressions have standard errors
clustered at the fund level that are reported in brackets. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***=statistical
significance at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% percent level, *=significant at the 10% level.
Two Months Three Months Four Months
Variable Ri −Rf Ri −RCAPM Ri −Rf Ri −RCAPM Ri −Rf Ri −RCAPM
∆(% Long) -1.124 -0.147 -1.13 -0.154 -0.887 -0.414
[0.706] [0.612] [0.878] [0.466] [0.810] [0.685]
∆(% Short) 2.506*** 1.519** 1.386* 0.003 1.222 0.474
[0.720] [0.675] [0.770] [0.580] [0.854] [0.770]
∆(% Derivatives) -1.916 -1.869 -0.082 0.673* -0.503 0.749
[1.705] [1.172] [1.608] [0.379] [1.129] [0.828]
∆(% Cash) -0.769** -0.322 0.297 0.269 -0.852 -0.799***
[0.377] [0.597] [0.406] [0.292] [0.553] [0.304]
Max(0,RS Long) -0.701*** -0.349*** -0.551*** -0.280*** -0.673*** -0.360***
[0.155] [0.096] [0.168] [0.081] [0.171] [0.109]
Min(0, RS Long) -0.297*** -0.214*** -0.190* 0.009 -0.112 -0.021
[0.092] [0.053] [0.107] [0.075] [0.094] [0.067]
Max(0,RS Short) 0.133*** 0.025 0.110*** 0.060* -0.015 0.007
[0.043] [0.028] [0.041] [0.031] [0.050] [0.031]
Min(0, RS Short) 0.005 -0.008 0.02 0.001 -0.002 -0.004
[0.019] [0.013] [0.021] [0.011] [0.022] [0.013]
Volatility 6m 0.049*** 0.008** 0.048*** 0.008** 0.049*** 0.009**
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
Age -0.151 -0.065 -0.210* -0.135 -0.268** -0.155
[0.109] [0.082] [0.118] [0.090] [0.128] [0.096]
AUM 0.074 -0.005 0.041 -0.039 0.012 -0.025
[0.056] [0.038] [0.063] [0.045] [0.064] [0.050]
Family AUM -0.106*** -0.026 -0.125*** -0.04 -0.130*** -0.047
[0.037] [0.027] [0.041] [0.029] [0.046] [0.034]
Lagged Return 0.202*** 0.076*** 0.131*** 0.058*** 0.098*** -0.011
[0.017] [0.012] [0.014] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013]
Flow (%) -0.325 -0.069 -0.282 0.04 -0.636 -0.406
[0.235] [0.204] [0.309] [0.205] [0.392] [0.255]
Constant -0.22 0.194 0.68 1.085*** 1.328** 1.087***
[0.474] [0.322] [0.543] [0.397] [0.579] [0.406]
Obs. 6,257 4,119 5,890 3,974 5,539 3,833
Adj. R2 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02104
Conclusion
This dissertation uses a seldom used and extremely rich data set of Brazilian funds to
shed light into issues relating to incentives and risk-shifting in the fund industry. The
first paper shows that using disaggregated data of fund flows at a higher frequency
evinces a shape for the fund-performance relationship different than the one suggested
in the literature. In particular, although best performing funds still benefit from most
of the inflows (convexity on the right tail), I find that the left tail of the distribution
is concave, not flat. This result is extremely important as most theoretical papers in
incentives and risk-shifting impose strict convexity in the flow-performance relation-
ship, in line with previous empirical papers. Moreover it implies that investors have
bad timing, buying high and selling low, as most practitioners argue. My result stems
mainly from the fact that investors are quicker than previously thought in punishing
the worst performing funds. As most papers use low frequency data, linking flows
in a given year with performance in the previous year, they are not able to pick the
short-term relation between (bad) performance and outflows. The next step is to ver-
ify whether investors indeed get a lower return on their investment than the fund’s.
For this it is necessary to have a longer series of inflows and outflows.
The second paper in this dissertation analyzes how funds change risk in response
to past performance. In particular, I disentangle the incentives generated by an
explicit remuneration contract offered to the fund manager from the incentives im-
plicitly generated by the flow-performance relationship. I show that contracts have
an asymmetric effect on risk and that the tournament within the fund family is the
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main driver of risk-shifting. In particular, results are compatible with families actively
engaging in the tournament by transferring risk from the worst performing funds to
the best and not just performance as other papers in the literature suggest. There
is a still incipient literature on strategic interactions between funds within the same
family that emphasizes how these family-related agency issues might affect investors.
The results in the first two papers can partly (and should) be tested using US
data. The third paper, however, dig into hedge funds portfolio holdings which are
usually not available. This paper, co-authored with Pedro A. Saffi, is the first, up
to our knowledge, to use portfolio holdings information on short sales. In particular,
we examine the impact of long and short positions on performance and test whether
changes in long/short positions and their risk can forecast future performance. While
we find that funds with large increases in the risk of long-only positions risk relative
to the previous 24 months underperform by about 3% per year on average, those that
increase the risk of short-only positions overperform their peers by about 1% a year on
average, net of fees. Neither monthly changes of long nor short positions can forecast
next month’s abnormal returns. This paper still needs to be further explored. The
uniqueness of the database allows for a much broader analysis which will be carried
out in the near future.
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